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Contumacious Responses to Firearms Legislation Balancing Federalism Concerns 
by 
Royce de R. Barondes 
James S. Rollins Professor of Law, University of Missouri 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (“LEOSA”) is one of the handful of federal 
statutes that preempt state firearms regulation. It allows covered individuals (certain 
current and retired qualified law enforcement personnel) to possess firearms 
notwithstanding assorted state restrictions — to protect themselves and to supplement 
local law enforcement efforts.  
The act reflects a careful legislative balancing of federalism concerns. Although it relies 
on states and localities to issue the authorizing credentials, it does not mandate states 
create a licensing regime out of whole cloth. The act ultimately presents issues requiring a 
nuanced assessment of the doctrine proscribing federal commandeering of the states. This 
Article probes the interpretation of LEOSA and the federalism issues raised by the act. 
Some state responses to LEOSA seem contumacious. Many judicial approaches seem 
hostile to recognizing the rights sought to be created by the act.  
In numerous ways, through patent violations and more debatable ones, states and their 
subdivisions have fettered the rights LEOSA appears to seek to grant. And there are 
federal administrative and local governmental interpretations coordinating the scope of 
LEOSA and the Gun-Free School Zones Act that are not required by customary principles of 
statutory interpretation and that significantly curtail LEOSA’s efficacy.  
The reluctance to recognize federally secured firearms rights is not limited to executive 
branch officials. Interpretation of the nuanced manner in which LEOSA endeavors to 
respect federalism principles has yielded miserly judicial interpretations, aberrant in the 




 FIREARMS LEGISLATION & FEDERALISM CONCERNS  2 
   
 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Alito has deprecated classification of Second Amendment 
rights as “second-class.”1 Yet, whether as to the primary right under the 
Second Amendment itself, or as to ancillary firearms rights arising by 
statute, the tack of some jurisdictions and localities seems surprisingly 
contumacious. This Article examines one federal statute securing 
certain rights to current and retired law enforcement officers, LEOSA.2 
As will be seen, one can encounter surprising disobedience to its 
commands. For example, Hawaii continues to post a policy directly 
contradicted by a 2010 amendment to the statute.3 
Judicial reactions as well can be puzzling — flouting ordinary 
interpretative canons. For example, one court suggests LEOSA, which 
is designed to authorize firearms possession by active and retired law 
enforcement officers, cannot ever benefit retirees because it is possible 
at some time a retiree may become intoxicated.4 That is, of course, 
contrary to the interpretative canons biasing in favor of an 
interpretation that gives effect to a provision5 and against reaching 
absurd results.6 But the assertion is even more outlandish, because 
                                            
1    McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (“Municipal 
respondents, in effect, ask us to treat the right recognized in Heller as a second-class 
right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights 
guarantees that we have held to be incorporated into the Due Process Clause.”). 
2   Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–277, 118 Stat. 865 
(2004) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B, 926C (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
115–40)). 
3   See infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
4   In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 764 n.24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (“As a 
practical matter, it is unclear how a permit can be issued based upon LEOSA 
qualification. That is so because a retired officer’s status under LEOSA depends, in 
part, upon whether the retired officer is or is not intoxicated while in possession of the 
firearm — a determination that cannot be made when a permit is issued.”). 
5   E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 63 (“A textually permissible interpretation that favors rather than 
obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.”). 
6   SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 234 (“A provision may be either disregarded or 
judicially corrected as an error (when the correction is textually simple) if failing to do 
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there simply is no statutory language in the directly cited section that 
can be so construed.7 
As noted, LEOSA is designed to allow certain current and former law 
enforcement officers to possess firearms. The statute preempts state 
and local restrictions, subject to limited exceptions. More detail of the 
basic framework is provided in Part I. 
There are a number of disputed issues concerning the scope of 
LEOSA, meaning the extent of state and local preemption. And one can 
encounter public statements that, to varying degrees of certainty, are 
contradicted by the language of LEOSA itself. Part II identifies the 
primary issues of scope. Those issues, and this Article’s conclusions, 
include the following:  
First, some would question whether LEOSA preempts local 
restrictions on features of firearms, e.g., restrictions on magazine 
capacities and on laser sighting systems. As explained in Part II.A, 
neither a tedious literal reading of the statute nor reference to its 
purposes would support the view that these limits are not preempted. 
Second, one can encounter assertions that these arms may need to be 
registered, an assertion not supported by the statutory language.  
Third, some would seek to limit the statute to persons who are or 
were full-time as law enforcement officers. As Part II.C. shows, that 
assertion is not supported by either the statutory language or its 
legislative history.  
Fourth, there are assorted statements, by commentators as well as 
by federal and local agencies, asserting the act is ineffective to allow 
firearms possession within 1000 feet of a school (under the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act).8 Part II.D shows that these plodding constructions 
are unwarranted, inconsistent with the approach to statutory 
interpretation taken in King v. Burwell9 (involving interpretation of the 
phrase “established by the State under section 1311,” as used in the 
Affordable Care Act). Among other things, the interpretative approach 
                                            
7   The paragraph addressing issuing credentials does not reference intoxication. The 
statute references intoxication only as part of a defined term, 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(6) 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40); and that defined term is not used in the 
paragraph that addresses the process for, and the conditions on, the issuance of 
complying credentials. 18 U.S.C. § 926C(d).  
8   See infra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 




 FIREARMS LEGISLATION & FEDERALISM CONCERNS  4 
   
this Article rejects would result in LEOSA generally being ineffective. 
Additionally, it would result in a separate statute that attempts to 
allow armored car personnel to work interstate while armed, which 
would be construed in pari materia, to be completely ineffective.10 
With this background, we can then turn to federalism issues 
presented by LEOSA. The authorization provided by LEOSA relies on 
credentialing provided by states and local governments. There is not a 
general federal mechanism to issue credentials.11 Some states do not 
facilitate the issuance of credentials. For example, a jurisdiction may 
refuse merely to confirm to another jurisdiction a retiree’s former 
employment and status and thereby prevent accession to rights under 
LEOSA.  
A question arises whether the prohibition on commandeering would 
not allow the federal government to require a state to participate in the 
credentialing. Although to benefit from LEOSA one has to be certified 
as passing firearms qualification, the scope of persons who can certify 
the training is sufficiently broad that a typical dispute likely will 
involve mere confirmation of former employment. Part III.A notes 
nuance in the commandeering jurisprudence, often elided, would 
indicate that it would be constitutional for LEOSA to mandate 
provision of information necessary for credentialing. 
Part III.B continues our examination of private rights, examining 
authority that has addressed the existence of a private right of action 
for LEOSA beneficiaries. The steady authority restricting a private 
right of action has been countered by a recent opinion from the United 
States Court of Appeals12 holding LEOSA creates a right enforceable 
under section 1983 of title 42. Much of the earlier authority addressed 
the issue of whether there is an implied right of action under LEOSA 
itself (i.e., without reference to section 1983), involving a higher 
threshold than would typically be applicable. Because those charged 
would be state actors, the more limited set of requirements for a finding 
of a right cognizable by section 1983 would be the initial inquiry. The 
                                            
10   See Part II.D.5, infra. 
11   Retired federal law enforcement officers do qualify. 18 U.S.C. § 926C(e)(2) 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). For them, credentialing would involve federal 
participation. 
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recent authority, as Part III.B shows, finding a right exists has the 
better of the argument. An opinion from the Southern District of New 
York, taking the opposite approach,13 relies on appellate authority that 
is both inapposite and unsupported itself. 
I. BASIC FRAMEWORK OF LEOSA 
LEOSA provides in part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any State or 
any political subdivision thereof, an individual who is a qualified 
law enforcement officer and who is carrying the identification 
required by subsection (d) may carry a concealed firearm that has 
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, 
subject to subsection (b).14 
Another provision extends similar benefits to retirees by substituting a 
reference to “retired law enforcement officer” for “law enforcement 
officer.”15 Each section requires the individual not be under the 
influence of intoxicants.16 Each section excludes from its preemption (i) 
laws of any state that allow private persons to prohibit possession on 
their property and (ii) state prohibitions on possession on state or local 
government property.17  
The drafting is somewhat unexpected in its reference to non-federal 
governmental property. In essence, a literal reading of the statute 
would provide that the authorization afforded by LEOSA does not 
extend to state or local property where state law prohibits possession, 
but it does authorize possession on local property if it is only a local 
regulation or an ordinance that bans possession on the local 
government property.18 
                                            
13   Ramirez v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (PANYNJ), No. 15cv3225 (DLC), 2015 WL 
9463185, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015). 
14   18 U.S.C. § 926B(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). See also id. 
§ 926C(a). 
15   18 U.S.C. § 926C(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). To qualify, the 
retiree must have served for an aggregate of at least 10 years or have separated due to 
a service-connected disability. Id. § 926C(c)(3). 
16   18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(c)(5), 926C(c)(6). 
17   The term “State” is expressly defined as including the District of Columbia. 18 
U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
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This literal construction does not necessarily produce an absurd 
result — one that would in the ordinary case necessarily be rejected.19 
Requiring an out-of-state traveler to know the law of each municipality 
is orders of magnitude more burdensome than the burden, substantial 
in itself, to know the state law of each state in which one is traveling. 
Numerous states preempt local regulation of firearms possession20 for 
this reason.21 Thus, it is at least conceivable that the statute was 
crafted so as to make it more practicable for a person authorized under 
LEOSA to determine the prohibited areas. 
For a current officer, the required credential is the employer-issued 
“photographic identification . . . that identifies the employee as a police 
officer or law enforcement officer of the agency.”22 For retired law 
enforcement officers, the required credentials constitute photographic 
identification from the former agency that “identifies the person as 
having been employed as a police officer or law enforcement officer”23 
together with certification, within the past year, from the former agency 
or the retiree’s state of residence, that the retiree meets firearms 
qualification standards.24 The act does not expressly require a state 
                                                                                                              
 (i) paragraph (a) generally preempts firearms restrictions in a “provision of 
the law of any State or any political subdivision thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 926C(a) 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
 (ii) Paragraph (b) provides an exception, under which the section does not 
“supersede or limit the laws of any State that . . . restrict the possession of 
firearms on any State or local government property, [etc.] . . . .” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 926C(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
Thus, the language explicitly distinguishes between prohibitions imposed by state law 
and those imposed by local law and, when it sets-forth those restrictions that are not 
preempted on government property, it only references “the laws of any State.”  
See generally C.D. MICHEL, CALIFORNIA GUN LAWS 264 (4th ed. 2016) (“Consequently, 
it appears that a person carrying pursuant to LEOSA is exempt from local 
restrictions.”). 
19   E.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“When  
that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond 
the words to the purpose of the act.”). 
20   E.g. Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 133 (2013).  
21   Cf. Blocher, supra note 20, at 136 (“Supporters of preemption emphasize the 
difficulty of complying with different local gun regulations . . . .”). 
22   18 U.S.C. § 926B(d). 
23   18 U.S.C. § 926C(d)(1), (2)(A). 
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issue all necessary credentials; were the statute to require credential 
issuance, it could be the subject to challenge (albeit one that should not 
be successful)25 as commandeering invalidated under Printz v. United 
States.26 
The preemption extends to “carry[ing] a concealed firearm,”27 which 
often would exclude possession of rifles (at least where possessed for 
self-defense).28 The act does not preempt restrictions on fully automatic 
weapons and silencers.29 It was amended in 2010 to preempt 
prohibitions on possession of “ammunition not expressly prohibited by 
Federal law or subject to the provisions of the National Firearms Act.”30 
Some states have restrictions on types of ammunition not prohibited 
under federal law, which has given rise to some tension in state 
accommodation to the requirements of federal law.31 
                                                                                                              
One anomaly in the statute is that qualification for a retiree depends on his or her 
having been “separated from service in good standing from service with a public agency 
as a law enforcement officer.” 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(1). However, the credential is not 
required to contain an affirmation that the individual was in “good standing.” Id. 
§926C(d)(1). The phrase “good standing” only appears once in the section. Id. § 926C. A 
credentialing unit may endeavor nevertheless to assume some role in assuring good 
standing by imposing conditions on the issuance of the permit. See generally, e.g., infra 
note 103 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey’s discretionary issuance of 
credentials); Kittle v. D’Amico, No. 4763–14, 2015 WL 12805146 at *3–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2015) (discussed infra note 213 and accompanying text). State v. Andros, 958 A.2d 78, 
84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (citation omitted), reaches the following conclusion 
as to the ability to revoke a credential: “But a retired officer’s conduct permits the 
licensing state to revoke the permit, as evidenced by the requirements for qualification 
and testing every year. In other words, the federal act expressly permits states to set 
‘standards for training and qualification’ consistent with those of ‘active law 
enforcement officers.’ ” 
25   See infra Part III.A. 
26   521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
27   18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(a), 926C(a). 
28   But see infra note 81 (discussing People v. Peterson, No. 08 CF 1169 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Oct. 1, 2010)). 
29   18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(e), 926C(e). 
30   Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Improvements Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111–272, 124 Stat. 2855 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(e)(2), 926C(e)(1)(a)). 
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 The benefit generally is restricted to persons who have, or had, 
“statutory powers of arrest.”32 As discussed in Part II.C, infra, there is 
some disagreement whether the act benefits individuals having only 
limited powers of arrest. Somewhat curiously, a current officer must be 
“authorized by the agency to carry a firearm,”33 although a retiree’s 
qualification does not expressly depend on his or her having been so 
authorized during employment.34 
In some ways, the statutory language does not work (at least as one 
might expect). It only protects the carrying of an arm, as opposed to all 
possession of an arm (the latter category being more extensive).35 
Assorted circumstances may result in one who seeks to benefit from 
LEOSA to need not to carry it. That can be because he or she is (or 
intends to become) intoxicated, or he will engage in activity that will 
not allow him or her to keep carrying the firearm, e.g., certain athletic 
activities or medical treatment. Engaging in those activities may make 
it impossible or impracticable to do something with the arm that is 
lawful. The arm may have features that will result in its possession 
being unlawful when possessed by anyone, other than under LEOSA.36  
II. PRIMARY ISSUES OF SCOPE 
Four issues concerning the scope of the protection afforded by 
LEOSA merit separate development: 
 (i) the extent to which LEOSA preempts state and local 
restrictions on types or features of arms; 
 (ii) whether LEOSA preempts state and local requirements 
to register arms; 
                                            
32   18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(c)(1), 926C(c)(2). Currently, persons having “statutory powers 
of . . . apprehension under section 807(b) of title 10, United States Code (article 7(b) of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice) are also expressly included. 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 926B(c)(1), 926C(c)(2).  
33   18 U.S.C. § 926B(c)(2). 
34   See 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c) (not including such a requirement); see also infra note 98 
and accompanying text. Administrative convenience could account for this statutory 
construct. 
35   See infra notes 125–136 and accompanying text. 
36   The default recommendation to provide it to law enforcement may not be 
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 (iii) whether LEOSA benefits persons who have or had 
curtailed powers of arrest; and 
 (iv) whether whether authorization under LEOSA is 
sufficient to exculpate one from the prohibitions in the federal 
Gun-Free School Zones Act, as amended.37 
 
A. Types of Arms, Especially Magazine Limits.  
Following District of Columbia v. Heller38 and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,39 a complete ban on handgun possession within a jurisdiction 
would be unconstitutional. However, states have adopted a variety of 
restrictions on the types of firearms that may be possessed. Some states 
promulgate lists of authorized firearms, banning sales of those that are 
not listed.40 In addition, state law may ban possession of firearms 
having certain features. There are local bans as well, e.g., Chicago bans 
possession of a handgun with laser sights, subject to certain 
exceptions.41 Bans on magazines that may hold more than a specified 
number of cartridges are particularly relevant for our purposes, because 
millions of those restricted magazines are privately owned.42 Those 
                                            
37   18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
38   554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
39   561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
40   California provides a roster of firearms, prohibiting sale of firearms that are not 
on the roster. CAL. PENAL CODE § 32000 (Westlaw through urgency legislation through 
Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.).  
A private person cannot purchase a handgun outside his state of residence and 
import it into his state of residence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
115–40). But, in California, for out-of-state residents, “It is legal to bring an ‘off-Roster’ 
handgun on your visit to California.” C.D. MICHEL, CALIFORNIA GUN LAWS 181 (4th ed. 
2016). Maryland prohibits sales of handguns not on their roster. MD. CODE ANN. PUB. 
SAFETY § 5–406(a)(2) (Westlaw through legislation effective June 1, 2017). 
41   CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8–20–60 http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/
gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/municipalcodeofchicago?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0
$vid=amlegal:chicago_il (prohibition on possession of a “laser sight accessory,” subject 
to certain exceptions for persons acting in the scope of their duties) (visited July 21, 
2017). 
42   See infra note 49 and accompanying text (addressing the quantity). In addition, 
there are concerns about functionality as to some alternative magazines. See infra note 
53. 
David Kopel provides the history of firearm magazines and prohibitions in David B. 
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bans may merely restrict transactions in the weapons, and thus not 
prohibit possession where otherwise lawfully acquired, i.e., they would 
not prohibit possession by out-of-state persons exercising rights under 
LEOSA; or they may prohibit possession as well.43  
Assorted litigation has challenged restrictions on types of firearms as 
violating the Second Amendment. Illustrative are challenges to 
                                                                                                              
849 (2015). New York’s hurriedly-enacted legislation initially prohibited magazines 
acquired post-enactment that could accommodate more than seven rounds. 2013 Sess. 
Law News of N.Y. Ch. 1, § 38 (S. 2230) (McKinney’s). Complying magazines are 
unavailable for many semi-automatic firearms. See generally Jessica Alaimo, N.Y. Gun 
Law Mandates Magazines That Don’t Exist, USA Today (updated Mar. 1, 2013), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/27/new-york-gun-law-seven-round
-magazines-dont-exist/1950433/ (“This means that in less than two months gun dealers 
such as Paul Martin, owner of Pro-Gun Services in Victor, who deal mostly in full-size 
guns for sports enthusiasts, can only sell something that doesn’t exist yet. Seven-round 
and smaller magazines do exist for a number of older and specialty models, including 
1911 pistols. But firearms experts said seven-round magazines for the most popular 
models for sports enthusiasts are rare and hard to find.”). This limit was subsequently 
increased to ten. 2013 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 57 (S. 2607–D) (McKinney’s), Part 
FF, § 2. 
43   Included in jurisdictions banning are, e.g., New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 265.00(23) (defining “large capacity ammuniting feeding devices”) (Westlaw through 
L.2017 chs. 1 to 457), id. § 265.02(8) (generally criminalizing their possession); 
Connecticut; Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–12–302 (Westlaw through First 
Extraordinary Sess. 71st General Assembly (2017)); and California. Effective July 1, 
2017, California has criminalized mere possession of a magazine that can accept more 
than 10 cartridges. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 16740, 32310(c) (Westlaw through urgency 
legislation through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). There are exceptions for retired sworn 
peace officers and retired sworn federal law enforcement officers. CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 32406(a). The former appears generally not to include out-of-state peace officers. See 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.39 (including certain law enforcement officers from adjacent 
states as “a peace officer in this state”).  
Connecticut has complicated provisions regulating possession of magazines that 
may accept more than 10 cartridges. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53–202w, 53–202x 
(Westlaw through June 20, 2017). There are certain provisions allowing registration of 
retired law enforcement officers, which, although ambiguous, appears to be limited to 
Connecticut officers, and, curiously, “[a] member of the military or naval forces of this 
state or of the United States.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53–202w(d)(2), (3) (Westlaw 
through June 20, 2017). Authorized persons are permitted to possess the magazines 
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California’s “roster;”44 to restrictions on modern sporting rifles;45 and to 
magazine limits.46 They have generally been unsuccessful. Two notable 
exceptions are the invalidation of a New York requirement that one 
load no more than seven cartridges in a magazine47 and a recent district 
court opinion, going against the trend, enjoining California’s ban on 
possession of magazines that can accept more than ten cartridges.48 
Whether LEOSA preempts state magazine restrictions is rather 
important in practice. Pistols with magazines having capacities of 15 or 
17 rounds are common. An employee of the National Shooting Sports 
Foundation has estimated there are over 100 million magazines 
possessed by consumers that have capacities exceeding 10 rounds of 
ammunition, approximately half of all the magazines possessed by 
consumers.49 An officer or retiree from a state not having such a limit 
may not own diminished-capacity magazines.  
A variety of reasons can result in individuals having firearms for 
self-defense wishing to have magazines exceeding ten rounds. One can 
encounter numerous circumstances where more than ten rounds are 
used for defensive purposes. The well-known trainer Massad Ayoob 
                                            
44   See generally Pena v. Lindley, No. 2:09–CV–01185–KJM, 2015 WL 854684 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 26, 2015) (granting summary judgment against a challenger to the roster 
requirements); supra note 40 (discussing California’s roster). 
45   Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he banned assault 
weapons and large-capacity magazines are not protected by the Second Amendment.”); 
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 263 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(upholding restrictions on certain sporting rifles), cert. denied sub nom. Shew v. Malloy, 
136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016); Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1249, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (express ban on AR–15s). 
46   Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he banned assault 
weapons and large-capacity magazines are not protected by the Second Amendment.”); 
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 247 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied sub nom. Shew v. Malloy, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (“We hold that the core 
provisions of the New York and Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of 
semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity magazines do not violate the Second 
Amendment, and that the challenged individual provisions are not void for 
vagueness.”); Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1249, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(discussing ban on magazines holding more than ten rounds).  
47   New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 264 (2d Cir. 
2015), cert. denied sub nom. Shew v. Malloy, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016). 
48   Duncan v. Becerra, No. 17–cv–1017–BEN–JLB at 66 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2017). 
49   Declaration of James Curcuruto in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
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provides details of five illustrative private defensive firearms uses 
involving more than fifteen rounds, including one person who used 
forty-five cartridges in assisting a law enforcement officer who was 
attacked by persons the officer had detained.50  
Ayoob notes that in many circumstances, such as a person who is 
awakened in the night, the clothing one is wearing may make it 
impracticable to carry additional magazines.51 He concludes, “Any 
suggestion that private citizens simply carry more guns or more 
ammunition feeding devices would, for the reasons stated above, be 
impractical. . . . Criminals bent on causing harm, on the other hand, 
even assuming they were impeded from obtaining over ten-round 
magazines by [state law], could simply arm themselves with multiple 
weapons, and often do.”52 
Additionally, one can see anecdotal references to down-sized 
magazines not functioning properly in firearms.53 
There is some uncertainty concerning whether LEOSA preempts 
these magazine restrictions. For example, a text on California law, 
written by an eminent practitioner in the firearms law area, asserts, 
“[R]estrictions on magazines would apply unless the officer meets an 
exemption to those restrictions pursuant to that state’s laws.”54 
                                            
50    Declaration of Massad Ayoob in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction; Exhibits A–C, at 5–7, Duncan v. Becerra, No. 17–cv–1017–BEN–JLB (S.D. 
Cal. May 5, 2017). They include: sixteen rounds in response to three attackers; thirty 
rounds in response to three attackers; forty-five rounds by a private person assisting a 
police officer attacked by an occupant of a detained vehicle, where the private person 
“prevented the assailants from ‘finishing off’ the officer;” fifteen rounds discharged by 
an attacked pizza delivery man; and approximately nineteen shots by a watch shop 
owner. 
51   Ayoob, supra note 50, at 8. 
52   Ayoob, supra note 50, at 8. 
53   For example, a search of www.pistol-forum.com (visited July 21, 2017) reveals 
dissatisfaction expressed by someone identified as “staff” and “S.M.E.” (subject-matter 
expert) DocGKR, who in a July 11, 2013, post references having encountered difficulties 
with reduced-capacity magazines for a particular, common firearm. This author is not 
expressing any opinion as to whether those statements are accurate as to that 
particular firearm and magazine combination. He is rather indicating that some have a 
preference, whether well-founded or otherwise, for the originally-designed OEM 
magazines. 
54   C.D. MICHEL, CALIFORNIA GUN LAWS 264 (4th ed. 2016). See also, e.g., Jeremy 
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Although that may be a prudent position to take in advising a client as 
to how to proceed, the better reading of the statute is that it preempts 
state and local magazine limits. 
Let us first turn to the language of LEOSA. It provides in pertinent 
part that, as to a covered person: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law of any State or 
any political subdivision thereof, an individual . . . may carry a 
concealed firearm that has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce, subject to subsection (b).55 
The term “firearm” is defined as follows: 
As used in this section, the term “firearm” — 
(1) except as provided in this subsection, has the same meaning 
as in section 921 of this title; 
(2) includes ammunition not expressly prohibited by Federal 
law or subject to the provisions of the National Firearms Act; and 
(3) does not include — 
(A) any machinegun (as defined in section 5845 of the 
National Firearms Act); 
(B) any firearm silencer (as defined in section 921 of this 
title); and  
(C) any destructive device (as defined in section 921 of this 
title).56 
The underlying referenced definition of “firearm” is: 
                                                                                                              
PUBLIC SAFETY (Jan. 13, 2016), https://inpublicsafety.com/2016/01/retired-police-as-
force-multipliers-the-leosa-effect-2/ (article by adjunct and part-time university faculty 
members stating, “High-capacity magazines are not allowed, per the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives . . . .”); Richard Fairburn, Blue Hawaii: Some States 
Make CCW under LEOSA Tough for Cops, POLICEONE.COM (July 6, 2015) (“The LEOSA 
statute does not exempt you from the magazine limitations . . . .”); Law Enforcement 
Officers Security Unions, LEOSA Law Enforcement Officers’ Safety Act, 
http://www.leosu.org/leosa-law-enforcement-officers-safety-a (visited July 12, 2017) 
(“The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has ruled that State 
and local laws and regulations applying to magazines do apply and the exemption 
provided by LEOSA applies only to firearms and ammunition.”). 
55   18 U.S.C. § 926B(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40) (addressing current 
officers; comparable terms for retired officers at 18 U.S.C. § 926C(a) (Westlaw through 
Pub. L. No. 115–40)). 
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(3) The term “firearm” means (A) any weapon (including a 
starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be 
converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) 
the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler 
or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such term does 
not include an antique firearm.57 
This author’s ultimate conclusion is that there is little support for 
concluding that LEOSA does not preempt magazine limits. To conclude 
it does not preempt magazine limits, one would need, by referencing 
extrinsic language or circumstances, to find ambiguous the facially 
unambiguous statutory language. One would need to avoid application 
of the “cardinal” principle of construction that rejects an interpretation 
that makes language surplusage.58 And one would need to distinguish 
construction of similar language in another section of the Gun Control 
Act of 1968, which should be construed in pari materia and which has 
been construed as preempting restrictions on firearm features.59 To 
conclude that authority is incorrect would substantially eviscerate the 
efficacy of that other section. Lastly, even were to take that approach to 
legislative interpretation, the legislative history would reject that 
position. 
Perhaps a first step in applying these statutory provisions is to note 
that a magazine is an integral part of a semi-automatic pistol.60 Some 
semi-automatic pistols will not function if a magazine is not installed.61 
That is sometimes referenced as a “safety feature,” which decreases the 
likelihood there will be an unintended discharge when the pistol is 
being cleaned.62 Although many semi-automatic pistols will discharge a 
round when a magazine is missing, that configuration — with a 
                                            
57   18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
58   See infra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
59   See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
60   Duncan v. Becerra, No. 3:17–cv–1017–BEN, at 16 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) 
(order granting preliminary injunction) (stating magazines “are necessary and integral 
to the designed operation of these arms”). 
61   Duncan v. Becerra, No. 3:17–cv–1017–BEN, at 17 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) 
(order granting preliminary injunction). 
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magazine removed — is not the one in which they are designed to be 
possessed for self-defense.  
With that background, then, one can easily ascertain that, by literal 
application of the definitions, a semi-automatic pistol having a 
magazine is a firearm — it is a “weapon . . . which . . . is designed to . . . 
expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” and it is not designed to 
do anything else. The capacity of the magazine simply is not relevant to 
deciding whether the item qualifies as a firearm, but the magazine (of 
whatever capacity it is) is necessary for the item, if possessed, to 
function as a firearm in the ordinary, intended way. 
To state the obvious, a literal interpretation of a statute requires one 
reference what is in the statute. One does not begin a literal 
interpretation of a statute by ascertaining whether it does or does not 
contain a particular word. Rather, one reads the words actually present. 
If a person is possessing an ordinary handgun with its original 
equipment magazine, e.g., capable of containing 17 rounds, one is 
possessing a firearm, as that term is used in LEOSA (provided it is not 
a machinegun and does not have a suppressor attached to it). As to that 
possession by a qualifying person, LEOSA states the item may be 
carried concealed “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the law of 
any State . . . .” So, this literal interpretation is easy. A state prohibition 
based on a feature of what is being carried is included in “any other 
provision.” So, the state prohibition is preempted.  
To put it another way, only by rewriting “any,” substituting “some” 
or some such, can one have statutory language that would literally 
subject this possession to state laws (other than on state or local 
property, or private property restricted by a controlling person). 
Because “any” does not generally mean “some” in this construct, it 
requires a peculiar non-literal interpretation to state that magazine 
limits are not preempted. 
That is of course relevant, because starting with a review of the 
language of a statute involves assessing the language as it was adopted. 
One occasionally encounters novelty pistols such as ones that also 
have blades mounted on them.63 Because the addition of a blade 
                                            
63   E.g., Chris Eger, 5 Knife-Equipped Handguns: Pistols with a Point, GUNS.COM 
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contemplates a use other than expelling a projectile, one might quibble 
whether such an item is within the protection of the statute, 
preempting any state law restricting bayonet mounts and the like.64 
But, the magazine capacity is not subject to such an objection. 
There are fully automatic pistols,65 and those pistols (referenced as 
“machineguns” in the statute66) can be possessed by private persons 
who comply with Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended,67 
                                                                                                              
with-a-point/ (visited July 21, 2017) (“In the early 2000s, the well-respected Czech arms 
giant CZ-Brno offered a $100 bayonet attachment for their CZ-SP01 model handgun.”). 
64   The corresponding issue has been addressed as to whether “knuckles” become 
lawful where attached to a blade. The Court of Appeals of Alaska recently concluded 
not: 
Thrift[, the defendant,] argues that the statute requires the weapon to consist 
exclusively of finger rings or guards and cannot include finger rings or guards 
with a knife blade attached. He has a related argument that the statute 
“indicates [that] the finger rings or guards cannot serve another primary 
purpose, such as protecting the fingers or reducing the chance the bearer would 
unintentionally drop an item.” But the statute does not contain the words 
“exclusively” or “primary purpose,” and we do not agree that these restrictive 
readings can be taken from the statute. Under Thrift’s interpretation of the 
statute, the addition of a knife blade to an illegal weapon — a change that makes 
the illegal weapon even more dangerous — would render the formerly illegal 
weapon into a legal one. This is illogical. For example, a prohibited short-
barreled shotgun would not become legal or cease to be a shotgun simply because 
a bayonet was attached. 
Thrift v. State, No. A–11888, 2017 WL 2709732, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. June 21, 2017) 
(approving jury instructions stating, “Attaching a knife to metal knuckles, as defined 
above, does not cause the metal knuckles to become legal,” and parenthetically 
summarizing Thompson v. United States, 59 A.3d 961, 962–64 (D.C. 2013), to the 
following effect: “[T]the addition of a blade to metal knuckles simply made the weapon 
more versatile and more lethal; exempting it from the statute ‘would have the perverse 
effect of prohibiting possession of only the least dangerous versions of knuckles’”). 
65   See, e.g., ATF, Firearms – Guides - Importation & Verification of Firearms – 
National Firearms Act Definitions – Machinegun, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/firearms
-guides-importation-verification-firearms-national-firearms-act-definitions-0 (visited 
July 21, 2017) (depicting an Ingram MAC-10, a firearm not having a stock and not 
having a second, forward grip, in a collection of machineguns). 
66    26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40) (referencing “any 
weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, 
automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the 
trigger”). 
67   26 U.S.C. ch. 53 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40) (the successor to, and 
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and any applicable state or local law. The same applies to sound 
suppressors.68 Both types of items also can be possessed by state and 
local law enforcement officials (possession by those officials is subject to 
decreased regulation).69  
Some states do ban private possession of fully automatic weapons 
and firearm sound suppressors.70 However, LEOSA expressly excludes 
from its protection the carrying of fully automatic weapons71 and sound 
suppressors.72 State laws restricting carrying them are not preempted. 
This exception indicates, under the cardinal interpretative principle 
proscribing construction of language as surplusage,73 that LEOSA 
preempts restrictions on magazine capacity of arms otherwise carried in 
compliance with LEOSA. If the remainder of the language allowed a 
state to ban firearms having particular features, the express exception 
for machineguns and “silencers” would not be necessary.  
The holding in with Arnold v. City of Cleveland,74 interpreting a 
different section of the Gun Control Act of 1968, confirms that 
conclusion. Section 926A of title 18 provides a person who may lawfully 
possess a firearm: 
shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose 
from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such 
firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and 
carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is 
unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being 
                                            
68   Id. 
69   26 U.S.C. § 5853(a), (c).  
70   See, e.g., Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 450 (5th Cir. 2016) (tabulating assorted 
state restrictions on machineguns); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 
F.3d 242, 250 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing a prohibition on a barrel that can accept a 
sound suppressor), cert. denied sub nom. Shew v. Malloy, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016). 
71   18 U.S.C. § 926B(e)(3)(A). 
72   18 U.S.C. § 926B(e)(3)(B). 
73   E.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of 
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if 
it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.’ ” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
74   No. 59260, 1991 WL 228628, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1991), aff'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993). The ordinance was 
amended to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 926A following the decision of the Ohio Court of 
Appeals and the relevant part of that court’s opinion was not addressed by the Ohio 
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transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the 
passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle . . . .75 
These provisions should be interpreted in pari materia.76 If the 
statutory language in LEOSA, which provides a person “may carry a 
concealed firearm” does not preempt state and local restrictions on 
components having particular features, then the comparable language 
stating a person “shall be entitled to transport a firearm” also would not 
preempt state and local restrictions on component features. However, 
Arnold holds section 926A does preempt local bans on firearms having 
specified magazine capacities.77 
The legislative history of LEOSA confirms that it does preempt state 
and local magazine limits. The dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, 
Berman, Scott, Watt, Waters & Delahunt state: “In other words, once 
an officer qualifies to carry a service weapon, he will have the right 
under this bill to carry any gun, on-duty or off-duty . . . .”78 Moreover, 
the House committee rejected a proposed amendment that would have 
added to the arms excluded from the preemption a “semiautomatic 
                                            
75   18 U.S.C. § 926A (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
76   Cf. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 117 (1983) (stating the 
Gun Control Act of 1968, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921–931, and 18 U.S.C. 
App. § 1202(a)(1) (repealed 1986), “a gun control statute similar to and partially 
overlapping §§ 922(g) and (h)” have been treated in pari materia), superceded by 
statute, Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986), 
amended by Pub. L. No. 99–360, 100 Stat. 766 (1986), as recognized in Logan v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 23,  27–28 (2007); United States v. Spillane, 913 F.2d 1079, 1084 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (referencing construction in pari materia in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) 
and 18 U.S.C. § 1073); United States v. Wickstrom, 893 F.2d 30, 32 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(stating 18 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5845 and 921 should be construed in pari materia because 
“[a]ll three sections . . . were passed as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90–
618, 82 Stat. 1230 (1968).”). See generally United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 275–
77 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that a section of the Gun Control Act of 
1968 and a section of a separate act, regulating explosives, should be construed in pari 
materia, United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 272 
(2008), where one had been amended by Congress and the other had not). 
77   1991 WL 228628 at *1, 10. 
78   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 81, 85 (2004). But see generally State v. Andros, 958 
A.2d 78, 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (“[W]hen seeking to determine legislative 
intent, the United States Supreme Court has stated that ‘[t]he fears and doubts of the 
opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation.’” (quoting Shell 
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assault weapon.”79 If state bans on arms firearm features other than 
those listed (being fully automatic or having a silencer) were not 
preempted under the language that was approved, the proposed 
amendment would not have been necessary. 
There is only limited litigation addressing interpretation of this 
aspect of LEOSA. LEOSA’s scope was addressed in an amicus brief filed 
for the United States, as Amicus Curiae, in District of Columbia v. 
Barbusin.80 There the federal government’s briefing rejects the 
argument that LEOSA does not protect possession of an AR–15, a semi-
automatic sporting rifle. It notes the Barbusin defendant’s reference to 
the defeat of the proposed amendment to exclude “any semiautomatic 
assault weapon” from LEOSA, continuing: 
Although each of defendant’s points is valid, more importantly, 
in 2010, Congress made clear that the term “firearm” “has the 
same meaning” as in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (3) and also “includes 
ammunition not expressly prohibited by Federal law.” In 
pertinent part, § 921(c) (3) (A) defines a “firearm” as “any weapon 
. . . which will . . . expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” 
Defendant’s AR–15 and its accompanying ammunition satisfies 
this broad definition.81 
                                            
79   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 64, 67 (2004). Although a pistol could have constituted 
such “semiautomatic assault weapon,” magazine capacity would not have been relevant 
to the determination. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(C) (Westlaw United States Code 
Annotated–2004). 
80   Crim. No. 2012–CDC–913 (June 29, 2012). 
81   Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, District of Columbia v. 
Barbusin, Crim. No. 2012–CDC–913 (June 29, 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 926B(e) 
(n.d.)). The charges were ultimately dismissed on the basis of a discovery violation. 




One Illinois trial court opinion, reversed on other grounds, declines to decide as a 
matter of law whether LEOSA preempts state restrictions on particular types of 
firearms. People v. Peterson, No. 08 CF 1169 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2010) (Schoenstedt, J.), 
reprinted at http://www.policelawblog.com/blog/2010/10/leosa-ruling-in-the-context-of-
officer-felony-weapons-charge.html, vacated on other grounds, People v. Peterson, 923 
N.E.2d 890, 897–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction defendant’s 
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Lastly, one taking the position that LEOSA does not unambiguously 
preempt magazine limits, and who barely managed to convince a court 
that the statute is ambiguous, would fail by virtue of the rule of lenity: 
“[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity.”82 The Supreme Court has stated, as to the 
rule of lenity: 
This venerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle 
that no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a 
statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to 
punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also places the 
weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to 
speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in 
Congress’s stead.83 
                                                                                                              
involved allegations the rifle violated state law for having a barrel less than 16 inches. 
Peterson, 923 N.E.2d at 892. 
82   Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971). 
83   United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008). 
Application of principles of lenity are potentially more complex than is typically the 
case. Here we are construing separate exceptions to criminal liability, as opposed to 
simply construing a statute that criminalizes certain conduct. One can see the principle 
of lenity as arising from notions one should have notice of what is criminalized, and that 
courts should not usurp the role of selecting what conduct is criminal. E.g., United 
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (stating, as to the rule of lenity, “This 
venerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be 
held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or 
subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also places the weight of 
inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly and keeps 
courts from making criminal law in Congress’s stead.”). On these bases, that one is 
construing a preemption from criminalization, as opposed to the act affirmatively 
criminalizing conduct, would not seem to matter.  
It bears mention that this intersection of lenity and federalism is perhaps the 
opposite of the ordinary case. In addition to the typical justification of lenity as 
implicating Due Process and the need for fair notice of illegality, one justification 
sometimes involves limiting the scope of federal crimes to exclude federal intrusion into 
matters typically regulated by the states. Here we would have application of lenity that 
would implicate Due Process concerns but in a fashion that operated to enhance federal 
intrusion into state regulation of an area traditionally regulated by states. But see 
generally Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 684–85 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(identifying a federalism interest supporting lenity in rejecting an interpretation that 
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Treating state and local magazine restrictions as not preempted by 
LEOSA fosters the harms the Court indicates the rule of lenity seeks to 
avoid: to subject a person to criminal liability where the statutory 
framework is not certain in doing so, and places on the courts the 
responsibility for proscribing conduct criminally when the Congress 
itself declined to do so. The latter is particularly informative, where 
Congress did express itself as to possession of firearms with some 
features, explicitly allowing criminalization of some and explicitly 
rejecting allowing criminalization of others. 
B. Requirement to Register Arms; Flouting Provisions re. 
Ammunition.  
Some jurisdictions require registration of firearms. Hawaii 
guidelines published by its Department of the Attorney General state 
that a person taking a firearm to the state under the authority of 
LEOSA is required to comply with registration requirements.84 
LEOSA’s preemption of state law has no exception for state registration 
requirements, and the document fails to provide any theory under 
which the state requirement is not preempted. 
Occasionally one encounters responses to LEOSA that might be 
classified as contumacious. Hawaii’s response to LEOSA may well be an 
illustration. A document from its Attorney General states that a person 
exercising rights under LEOSA is required to comply with Hawaii law 
restricting permissible ammunition: “The ammunition loaded in your 
concealed firearm CANNOT be Teflon coated or designed to explode or 
segment upon impact.”85 LEOSA was amended in 2010 to preempt state 
and local restrictions on types of ammunition (other than ammunition 
                                            
84   The document states: 
If you bring a firearm to Hawaii and remain longer than five (5) days, you 
must register the firearm with the chief of police in the county in which you are 
staying. Every person arriving in the State who brings, or by any manner causes 
to be brought into the State, a firearm SHALL register the firearm with the chief 
of police of the county within five (5) days after arrival of the firearm or the 
person, whichever arrives later. See H.R.S. § 134–3. 
Dep’t of the Attorney General, State of Hawaii, Guideline for Carrying a Concealed 
Firearm in the State of Hawaii by a “Qualified Law Enforcement Officer” Pursuant to 
18 United States Code § 926B (Apr. 21, 2015), https://ag.hawaii.gov/cjd/files/2013/
01/LEOSA-guideline-for-QLEO-926B.pdf 
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“expressly prohibited by Federal law or subject to the provisions of the 
National Firearms Act”86). Segmenting ammunition is, however, 
commercially available to members of the public.87 This Hawaii policy 
manifestly is in violation of federal law. 
C. Limited Powers of Arrest and Part-Time Officers.  
Of course, it is entirely common for law enforcement officers to have 
territorial restrictions on assorted law enforcement activities.88 There 
has been some litigation involving classification for LEOSA purposes of 
persons holding positions other than those that immediately come to 
mind when one thinks of a law enforcement officer.89 Thorne v. United 
                                            
86   Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Improvements Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111–272, 124 Stat. 2855 (2010) “Sections 922(a)(7) and (8) [of title 18] prohibit, with 
exceptions, the manufacture or importation of armor piercing ammunition, and the sale 
of such ammunition by a manufacturer or importer.” STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS 
LAW DESKBOOK § 2:31 (Westlaw through Oct. 2016). Exploding ammunition may 
constitute a destructive device regulated by Title II. See United States v. Thomas, 111 
F.3d 426, 428 (6th Cir. 1997) (exploding shotgun shells). 
87   The Cabela’s chain sells G2 Research R.I.P. Handgun Ammunition, which is 
described as follows: 
Feed your handgun with G2 Research’s R.I.P. Handgun Ammunition for deep 
penetration and explosive fragmentation. Unique 100% copper-plated trocar 
design gives R.I.P. (Radically Invasive Projectile) bullets the ability to penetrate 
while the petals break from the base, creating additional, individual wound 
channels while the base continues on course. This penetration and separation 
combines to deliver maximum shock wave and wound path. 
http://www.cabelas.com/product/G-RESEARCH-R-I-P-HANDGUN-AMMO/2262015.uts 
(visited June 25, 2017). 
88   E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14–152 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 100 and J.R. No. 
7) (“The members and officers of a police department and force, within the territorial 
limits of the municipality, shall have all the powers of peace officers and upon view may 
apprehend and arrest any disorderly person or any person committing a breach of the 
peace.”); State v. Cohen, 375 A.2d 259, 264 (N.J. 1977) (concluding stating the authority 
of police officers of the Port Authority of New York “to arrest on view and without 
warrant a violator of any order, rule or regulation of the Authority for the regulation 
and control of traffic on bridge, tunnel, plaza or approach extend . . . to all other 
facilities now operated by the Authority” and to “the whole territorial area of the Port 
District itself,” and stating, “Consequently police officers can normally exercise the 
powers inhering in their office only within the confines of the jurisdiction which 
employs them.”). 
89   For example, the benefits of LEOSA are limited to persons who have or had 
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States90 holds that a person holding Virginia court appointments as a 
“special conservator of the peace” is not a law enforcement officer for 
purposes of LEOSA, where his employer is a private party, the 
Alexandria Security Patrol Corporation.91 Foley v. Godinez92 upholds a 
determination that parole agents, who allegedly “engaged in or 
supervised the prevention of crimes and the incarceration of people for 
violating state criminal laws and had statutory powers of arrest,” are 
not officers benefitting from LEOSA,93 affirming denial of the required 
                                                                                                              
§§ 926B(c)(1), 926C(c)(2). In re Casaleggio, 18 A.3d 1082, 1086 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2011) (footnote omitted) holds, “[T]he reference to LEOSA in N.J.S.A. 2C:39–6(l) 
does not encompass retired assistant prosecutors or deputy attorneys general. Rather, it 
is intended to accommodate retired law enforcement officers from out of state who have 
relocated to New Jersey.” However, prosecutors may have “statutory powers of arrest.” 
State v. Winne, 96 A.2d 63, 71 (N.J. 1953) (stating a county prosecutor is not “required 
personally to detect, arrest, indict and convict, though he may and often does do so”); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158–5 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 100 and J.R. No. 7) (“Each 
prosecutor shall be vested with the same powers and be subject to the same penalties, 
within his county, as the attorney general shall by law be vested with or subject to, and 
he shall use all reasonable and lawful diligence for the detection, arrest, indictment and 
conviction of offenders against the laws.”). See generally 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 51 
(Westlaw through June 2017). Prior to a 2013 amendment, National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112–239, § 1089, 126 Stat. 1632, 
1970–71 (2013), “[m]ilitary police officers did not qualify for protection under LEOSA 
because they possess[ed] statutory powers of apprehension, not arrest, as required by 
the statute.” State v. Pompey, No. A–3985–15T2, 2017 WL 655515, at *1 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Feb. 17, 2017). There is an analogous issue under state law. See, e.g., 
Orange Cty. Employees Assn., Inc. v. Cty. of Orange, 14 Cal. App. 4th 575, 577, 582 
(1993) (holding deputy coroners and court service officers are entitled to carry concealed 
firearms without a permit under state law); Stumpff v. State, 998 So. 2d 1186, 1187–88 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding an inactive volunteer/reserve/auxiliary officer with 
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission was exempt from state licensing 
requirements). See generally infra notes 105, 109 (providing legislative history 
addressing the broad scope). 
90   55 A.3d 873 (D.C. 2012). 
91   55 A.3d at 882. There are a number of reported cases involving these positions. 
Ord v. D.C., 587 F.3d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding plaintiff could assert 
preenforcement challenge), remanded to Ord v. D.C., 810 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2011), 
aff’d, No. 11–7134, 2012 WL 1155808 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2012). 
92   62 N.E.3d 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). 
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credentials because the determination was discretionary and thus not 
subject to mandamus review.94 
It seems that treatment of corrections officers is particularly likely to 
give rise to disputes.95 The court in DuBerry v. District of Columbia96 
suggests that corrections officers do benefit from LEOSA, noting, 
“Congress defined ‘qualified law enforcement officers’ broadly, to 
include individuals who engage in or supervise incarceration,” although 
leaving the ultimate determination unsettled, because it raises factual 
issues.97 The court continues, “Further, contrary to the District of 
Columbia’s suggestion at oral argument, the LEOSA does not require 
that, prior to retiring, a law enforcement officer’s job required carrying 
a firearm in order to be a “qualified retired law enforcement officer[ ].”98 
New Jersey, like Hawaii, seems to take a contumacious attitude 
toward LEOSA. A 2005 memorandum from the state’s Attorney 
General, a document that remains available through the state’s web 
site twelve years later, states in part: 
The passage of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety 
Act does not alter the obligation of retired New Jersey law 
enforcement officers to comply with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 
                                            
94   Godinez, 62 N.E.3d at 295 (“[E]ven if the Director erred in finding that plaintiffs 
were not qualified retired law enforcement officers, mandamus cannot be used to reach 
a different decision.”). See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 10–11, Moore v. Trent, No. 09 C 1712, 2010 WL 5232727 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 16, 2010) (stating, “correctional or parole officer’s arrest powers are not 
plenary, but are limited to the narrow categories enumerated,” and arguing, “The 
Training and Standards Board can legitimately take the position that only fully trained 
law enforcement officers, that is police officers, are eligible for the LEOSA identification 
card. This determination is fully consistent with LEOSA, which leaves it to the States 
to have a concealed carry certification program and to establish eligibility criteria for 
the wide range of job classifications that come under the generic category of law 
enforcement officers.”). 
95   For example, Sonoma County Law Enforcement Association v. County of 
Sonoma, 379 F. App’x 658 (9th Cir. 2010), involves “correctional deputies who work in 
the county jails” issued credentials that state “while correctional deputies are 
authorized to carry concealed firearms off-duty within California, they are not ‘qualified 
law enforcement officers’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 926B . . . .” Brief of 
Appellees at 4, Sonoma Cty. Law Enf’t Ass’n v. Cty. of Sonoma, 379 F. App’x 658 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09–16277), 2009 WL 6809634, at *4. 
96   824 F.3d 1046 (2016). 
97   Id. at 1053. 
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2C:39–6l in order to carry a firearm in this state. Absent statutory 
changes to our retired officer permitting procedures, it remains in 
full effect and officers must comply with its requirements.99 
That statute exempts certain retirees from the New Jersey 
prohibition on “unlawful possession of weapons.”100 The New Jersey 
statute was amended in 2007 to add to the excluded persons those who 
are qualified retired law enforcement officers domiciled in New 
Jersey,101 and again amended in 2017 to add miscellaneous full-time 
officers.102 The statute the New Jersey Attorney General indicates must 
be complied-with requires annual applications be made to the New 
Jersey Superintendent of State Police. The statute does not require 
issuance of the permit (i.e., it is discretionary), and contemplates 
hearings being available for those aggrieved by a denial.103  
Under LEOSA, a person who has retired as a potentially qualifying 
New Jersey police officer and become a domiciliary of another state, as 
long as he or she has the photographic identification attesting to his or 
her having been employed as a law enforcement officer, can get the 
remainder of his or her credentials from his or her state of residence.104 
LEOSA does not vest in the state from which an officer retired the 
exclusive control over licensure following retirement. This is relevant 
insofar as New Jersey seeks to exercise discretion in deciding whom to 
permit. Thus, insofar as the New Jersey policy purports to require its 
retirees to qualify under its statute (which is apparently the literal 
reading of that policy), the policy is unlawful. 
                                            
99   Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, Guidance Regarding the Law Enforcement 
Officers Safety Act of 2004 [PL 108–277 (HR 218)] (June 7, 2005), at http://www.nj.
gov/lps/dcj/agguide/pdfs/hr-218.pdf (visited June 26, 2017). 
100   N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39–5 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 100 and J.R. No. 7). 
101   The relevant paragraph of the statute was amended in 2007 to increase the age 
to 75 and to add an express exclusion for “; or is a qualified retired law enforcement 
officer, as used in the federal ‘Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004,’ Pub.L.108–
277, domiciled in this State,” in addition to other adjustments. 2007 N.J. Sess. Law 
Serv. Ch. 313, § 1 (Assembly 2158) (Westlaw). Modest changes were made in 2007 N.J. 
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 314, § 1 (Assembly 2224) (Westlaw). The statutory change was not 
well-written; it does not parse.  
102   2017 N.J. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 110 (Assembly 2690) (Westlaw). 
103   N.J. STAT. § 2C:39–6l(4), (5) (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 91 and J.R. No. 7.). 
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This is also relevant to retirees who worked part-time. It appears 
New Jersey takes the position that it need not recognize under LEOSA 
persons whose law enforcement activities were or are not full-time.105 
The statutory language does not support this limitation. Although the 
statute, as initially enacted, limited retiree benefits to a person who 
“before such retirement, was regularly employed as a law enforcement 
                                            
105   The memorandum of the New Jersey Attorney General, see Harvey, supra note 
99, states LEOSA “allows full-time active duty and retired law enforcement officers . . . 
to carry concealed firearms . . . without having first obtained permits to carry from a 
foreign state.” This provision, of course, does not literally state persons who are not full-
time do not benefit from LEOSA, though that is the better reading of the document — 
the inclusion of reference to “full-time” officers would be redundant without it.  
A part-time New Jersey sheriff, allegedly otherwise qualifying under LEOSA, who 
was denied a permit was one of the unsuccessful plaintiffs in Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 
426 (3d Cir. 2013). See Declaration of Finley Fenton at 1, Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. 
Supp. 2d 813 (D.N.J. 2012) (Civ. No. 10–06110 (WHW)), 2010 WL 10378297, aff’d sub 
nom. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013). The initial complaint recites that New 
Jersey takes the view that part-time officers do not benefit from LEOSA: 
75. Mr. Fenton is a “qualified law enforcement officer” within the meaning of 
the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2008 (“LEOSA”), and as such, federal 
law authorizes him to “carry a concealed firearm that has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 926B(a). 
76. However, the State of New Jersey, in a policy directive issued by 
Defendant Paula T. Dow on June 7, 2005, maintains that LEOSA protects only 
“full time” police officers. [See http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcj/agguide/pdfs/hr-218.pdf.] 
Mr. Fenton is afraid that he will be arrested and charged if he carries a handgun 
to protect himself while off-duty. 
Complaint for Deprivation of Civil Rights under Color of Law at 75–76, Piszczatoski v. 
Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813 (D.N.J. 2012) (Civ. No. 10–06110 (WHW)), 2010 WL 
10378297, aff’d sub nom. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013). The trial court 
disposed-of the complaint without the defendants having filed a responsive answer. 
Part of the discussion captured in the House Report on the legislation shows the 
breadth of individuals who would be entitled to benefit from LEOSA: 
Ms. LOFGREN. Reclaiming my time, in California, as the other Members from 
California will know, you become a law enforcement officer when you are 
accepted for peace officer standards and training training [sic], if you are POST 
certified. That includes weights and measure inspectors, it includes zoning 
administrators. It is very, very broad, and only some of those people actually get 
training. I mean, real cops obviously do, but there are a lot of people with POST 
training who are legally police officers, who are qualified under law, but who 
don’t ever use a gun — museum guards. 
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officer for an aggregate of 15 years or more”106 (there was no 
corresponding limitation applicable to current officers), that 
requirement was amended in 2010.107  
LEOSA provides its benefits extend to persons involved in the 
detection, investigation or prosecution of “any violation of law, and has 
[or had] statutory powers of arrest.”108 Legislators’ discussion of the 
scope referenced authorization of game and fisheries officers.109 The 
structure of the act is thus not amenable to a limiting construction 
under which it benefits only individuals who can be expected frequently 
to need to deploy firearms. It was clearly contemplated that it would 
not be so limited. 
Additionally, under LEOSA, a New Jersey domiciliary who has 
retired from a position in another state can, under LEOSA, obtain the 
required credentials and certification from the out-of-state agency. No 
action of New Jersey is required. Requiring the New Jersey domiciliary 
to obtain a permit from the New Jersey Superintendent of State Police 
is unauthorized by LEOSA.  
In some circumstances, courts restrictively construe federal statutes 
that impinge on the ordinary boundaries between federal and state 
regulation of activity. Bond v. United States references the following 
“well-established” interpretative principle: 
 “ ‘[I]t is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of 
Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides’ ” the 
                                            
106   Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–277, 118 Stat. 
865 (2004) (adding 18 U.S.C. § 926C(c)(3)(A)). 
107   Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Improvements Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111–272, § 2(c)(1)(C)(ii), 124 Stat. 2855 (2010) (substituting “served” for “was regularly 
employed”). 
108   18 U.S.C. § 926B(c)(1); id. § 926C(c)(2) (substituting “had” for “has”). 
109   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 55 (2004) (statement of Rep. Scott). See also id. at 54, 
62 (“Thinking back to my many years in local government, there are many peace 
officers that you would not think of as peace officers. We have park police, we have 
transit police, for example, we have all the correctional officers in Santa Clara County, 
where I served. There is a huge issue.”) (statement of Rep. Lofgren concerning a 
rejected amendment providing the act “shall not be construed to supersede or limit the 
rules, regulations, policies, or practices of any State or local law enforcement”); 150 
Cong. Rec. 13,671 (2004) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (“Under this proposal, a retired 
Customs inspector from Alabama can come into Massachusetts carrying a concealed 
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“usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” To 
quote Frankfurter again, if the Federal Government would 
“ ‘radically readjust[ ] the balance of state and national 
authority, those charged with the duty of legislating [must be] 
reasonably explicit’ ” about it.110 
This approach is sometimes termed a clear statement principle111 or the 
plain statement rule112 of statutory construction.113 Justice Breyer, in 
dissent, has asserted, “Private gun regulation is the quintessential 
exercise of a State’s ‘police power’ . . . .”114  
But it would be difficult to construe LEOSA restrictively so as to 
allow New Jersey to interpose this type of veto on retirees from New 
Jersey who were part-time and moved out-of-state, or on New Jersey 
retirees who moved out of state following retirement and whom, for 
whatever reason, the state decided not to license. Preemption of state 
and local regulation (subject to the express statutory limits) is patent 
and at the core of the act.115 Thus, insofar as New Jersey would purport 
to restrict reliance on LEOSA by its retirees who no longer need the 
state’s assistance in obtaining required credentials, that view is simply 
unsupported. A more difficult question, addressed in Part III, arises 
where some further act is required of New Jersey (or another state that 
wishes to restrict the types of persons who may be qualified under 
LEOSA). 
                                            
110   134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the 
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539–40 (1947) (first and second alterations 
in original)). See generally Royce de R. Barondes, Federalism Implications of Non-
Recognition of Licensure Reciprocity under the Gun-Free School Zones Act, __ J.L. & 
POL. __, __ (2017) (discussing the principle in the context of the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40)). 
111   E.g., Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002). 
112   E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991). 
113   A 1999 Executive Order also illustrates the bias against interpretations of 
Federal law that implicate Federalism concerns. Exec. Order No. 13,132, Federalism, 64 
Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
114   McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 922 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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D. Gun-Free School Zones Act. 
A variety of sources, both commentators116 and government 
entities,117 have asserted that LEOSA does not authorize possession of 
a firearm within 1,000 feet of an elementary secondary school — 
possession that generally is restricted by the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act.118 The Gun-Free School Zones Act has seven exceptions to the 
criminalization of firearms possession within 1,000 feet of an 
elementary or secondary school, including the following: 
 (ii) if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do 
so by the State in which the school zone is located or a political 
subdivision of the State, and the law of the State or political 
subdivision requires that, before an individual obtains such a 
license, the law enforcement authorities of the State or political 
                                            
116   E.g., James M. Baranowski, Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act: Off-limit 
Areas?, http://le.nra.org/leosa/off-limit-areas.aspx (“[I]ndividuals carrying under LEOSA 
do not qualify for the same exemptions some state permit holders benefit from in terms 
of . . . Gun Free School Zones (GFSZ).”) (visited July 24, 2017); The New York State 
Fraternal Order of Police, The Badge Newsletter at 13 (May/June 2015) (“No good in 
GUN FREE SCHOOL ZONES (Note:  you cannot be anywhere in the Borough of 
Manhattan and not be within 1000’ of a school zone)”), http://www.fop997.org/pdf/
TheBadgeNewsletter-Issue1.pdf.  
117   E.g., Secretary of the Navy, SECNAV Instruction 5580.3, at 3–4 (Jan. 19, 2017) 
(“This instruction does not . . . [c]ircumvent the provisions of § 922(q) of reference (h), 
which prohibits the possession of a firearm at a place the individual knows, or has 
reason to believe, is a school zone, unless the individual is officially on law enforcement 
duties.”), https://doni.documentservices.dla.mil/Directives/05000%20General%20Manag
ement%20Security%20and%20Safety%20Services/05-500%20Security%20Services/5580
.3.pdf; East Haven Police Department, Policies & Procedures No. 312.1 (May 28, 2015) 
(“LEOSA by its terms does not permit or authorize an individual to . . . [c]arry a firearm 
in violation of the Gun Free School Zone Act (18 U.S. Code 922(q)) or similar State 
law. . . . Federal laws governing the carrying of concealed firearms are not superseded 
by LEOSA.”), www.easthavenpolice.com/files/6714/3291/0686/312.1_-_Retired_Officers_
Firearms_LEOSAEffective_07-01-2015.pdf. 
On the other hand, a document posted on the FBI’s web site notes prohibitions on 
possession on state and local property are not preempted, but fails to mention the Gun-
Free School Zones Act. https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/january/off-duty-officers-and-firearms 
(visited July 24, 2017). Because that document references retirees, its failure to 
reference the Gun-Free School Zones Act prohibitions would be a surprising omission 
were there a conscious decision by the FBI that the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
prohibits retiree possession. 
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subdivision verify that the individual is qualified under law to 
receive the license; . . . 
 (iv) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official 
capacity . . . .119 
Clause (iv) does not exempt off-duty law enforcement officials and does 
not exempt retirees. So, the benefits of LEOSA would not extend to 
those persons whose travels take them within 1,000 feet of a school, 
unless either LEOSA implicitly repeals part of the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act or the exception in clause (ii) is broadly interpreted. As literal 
matter, clause (ii) involves licensure “by” the State where the school 
zone is located and thus may not, under a tediously literal 
interpretation, extend to federal licensure or licensure by another state. 
Nevertheless, because that hyper-literal interpretation would 
substantially eviscerate the core objective of LEOSA, and applying that 
interpretative approach to a separate provision exempting certain 
security personnel from state licensure would eviscerate it,120 a 
thoughtful court would reject it. 
1. Geographic Scope of Prohibition if LEOSA Licensure Does not 
Satisfy GFSZA. Before turning to applying the principles of statutory 
interpretation, it is helpful to provide the context by describing the 
impact of this hyper-literal interpretation. Representative Coble, who 
supported the bill,121 stated as to LEOSA, “The legislation is fairly 
broad in some areas. It allows current and retired State and local law 
enforcement officers to carry a concealed weapon anywhere in the 
country.”122 Chairman Sensenbrenner, who opposed the legislation, 
noted it “would override States’ right-to-carry laws and mandate that 
retired and active police officers could carry a concealed weapon 
anywhere within the United States.”123  
But vast swaths of non-rural parts of the country are within 1,000 
feet of a school zone.124 It can easily be the case that one cannot go 
about one’s business in a non-rural area without passing through a 
                                            
119   18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
120   See infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. 
121   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 75 (2004) (vote of Rep. Coble). 
122   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 22 (2004) (statement of Rep. Coble). 
123   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 22 (2004) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting 
as well, “It is no secret that I am opposed to this legislation.”). 
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school zone. These locations are too ubiquitous to assert they are de 
minimis and that legislators could simultaneously assert LEOSA allows 
firearms possession “anywhere” in the United States and elide 
reference to an exception for school zones were such an exception 
intended.  
2. Implications for LEOSA’s Limitation to Carrying a Firearm; 
Prohibit Anticipated Availability for Defensive Use. The United States 
asserted in an amicus brief in District of Columbia v. Barbusin that 
LEOSA preemption is restricted to persons who “carry a concealed 
firearm” — the term “carry” being more restrictive than (defining a 
subset of) mere possession.125 What precisely constitutes carrying a 
firearm for purposes of LEOSA is not clear. The Supreme Court has 
stated that to “carr[y] a fiream,” as used in another section of the Gun 
Control Act of 1968, as amended, includes one who is transporting it in 
a vehicle even if not immediately accessible, as in a locked glove 
compartment.126 Model jury instructions define carry as follows: 
 “Carrying” a firearm includes carrying it on or about one’s 
person. [“Carrying” also includes knowingly possessing and 
conveying a firearm in a vehicle which the person accompanies 
including in the glove compartment or trunk.]127 
                                            
125   Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, District of Columbia v. 
Barbusin, Crim. No. 2012–CDC–913 (June 29, 2012) (“However, LEOSA’s plain 
language is limited to the narrow act of carrying a concealed firearm, and does not 
include the broader act of possessing a concealed firearm without having ready access to 
it.”). 
126   Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998). 
127   Sixth Circuit Committee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Pattern 
Criminal Jury Instructions: Sixth Circuit 12.02 (Westlaw through 2013) (italics 
removed). See also 2A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & 
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 39:20, at 41 (Supp. 2016) (providing the following as a 
Seventh Circuit jury instruction: “A person ‘carries’ a firearm when he knowingly 
transports it on his person [or in a vehicle or container]. [A person may ‘carry’ a firearm 
even when it is not immediately accessible because it is in a case or compartment [such 
as a glove compartment or trunk of a car], even if locked.]”).  
There is some varying authority. E.g. 2A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 39:20, at 123 (2009) (providing Third Circuit jury 
instruction stating, “‘Carry’ means that the defendant (had the firearm on (his)(her) 
person) (possessed the firearm). (emphasis removed)). 
It bears mention that authority construing carrying in other statutory provisions 
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On the other hand, one may be considered as possessing a firearm in 
circumstances where one is not carrying it.128 The mere presence of a 
firearm in the bedroom of a location where a person was found has been 
held inadequate to prove the person carried the firearm.129 Thus, if 
authorization under LEOSA does not extend to locations within 1,000 of 
a school zone, a person may not be able even to leave the firearm 
outside school zones while he or she is engaged in activity within, or 
passes through, a school zone.  
For example, if the plodding interpretation is correct, it would 
appear that a person relying on LEOSA in California would not be able 
to leave a firearm containing a normal capacity magazine in some 
location outside a school zone. California would ban possession of the 
magazine,130 and that could result in its being possessed when it was 
not carried.131  
One cannot elide this issue by taking the position that these 
restrictions on features are not preempted by LEOSA.132 This problem 
                                                                                                              
States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Phelps, 877 F.2d 
28, 30 (9th Cir. 1989), and thus incorporate additional components. 
128   See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 799 F.3d 1318, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In 
order to be convicted under § 922(g)(1), a defendant must be a convicted felon that 
knowingly possesses a firearm that is ‘in or affecting interstate commerce.’ ‘Possession 
of a firearm may be either actual or constructive.’ A defendant is in constructive 
possession of a firearm when the defendant does not actually possess the firearm ‘but 
instead knowingly has the power or right, and intention to exercise dominion and 
control over the firearm.’ Jury instructions that imply knowledge or an awareness of the 
object possessed when defining constructive possession, substantially cover the 
requirement that a defendant knowingly possess a firearm — the use of such an 
instruction does not constitute reversible error.” (citations and paragraph break 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 576 (11th Cir. 2011))). 
129   United States v. Sheppard, 149 F.3d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating, “’Carry,’ 
in the ordinary sense of the word, means to move or transport.”). 
130   CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 16740, 32310(c) (Westlaw through urgency legislation 
through Ch. 9 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
131   See C.D. MICHEL, supra note 18, at 50 (“ ‘Constructive possession” means that 
you knowingly have control of, or have the right to control the object, either directly or 
through another person.”); Judicial Council of California Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Jury Instructions, Judicial Council Of California Criminal Jury 2500 
(Westlaw through May 2017) (sample jury instruction stating, “A person does not have 
to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the person has (control 
over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another person.”). 




 FIREARMS LEGISLATION & FEDERALISM CONCERNS  33 
   
is not limited to possession of items as to which there is a disagreement 
as to whether LEOSA preempts the relevant state restriction.  
For example, New Jersey makes it a crime if one “knowingly has in 
his possession” “hollow nose” ammunition, subject to limited exceptions 
for private persons.133 In the 9 milimeter caliber, this type of 
ammunition, not prohibited by federal law, is commonly used to limit 
the possibility of over-penetration, i.e., for safety purposes.134 New 
Jersey authority indicates that one would be treated as “having in his 
possession” hollow point ammunition if it is left in a location over which 
one has exclusive access.135 Thus, if LEOSA licensure by another state 
(or the federal government) does not satisfy the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act, an individual relying on LEOSA in these kinds of circumstances 
might, while in a school zone, need to keep the arm unloaded in a 
locked container he was carrying (that would be within another Gun-
Free School Zones Act exception). Simply leaving it at his temporary 
dwelling might be criminal.  
Of course, carrying a firearm in this manner is not suitable for use in 
self-defense. But allowing one to carry a firearm in a condition suitable 
for use in self-defense is a primary purpose of the act: 
While a police officer may not remember the name and face of 
every criminal he or she has locked behind bars, criminals often 
have long and exacting memories. A law enforcement officer is a 
target in uniform and out; active or retired; on duty or off. 
                                            
133   N.J. STAT. § 2C:39–3.f, .g (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 91 and J.R. No. 7). There 
are assorted exceptions in New Jersey, which are not applicable to restrictions on 
possession of hollow point ammunition, for possession of some other arms. N.J. STAT. 
§ 2C:39–6.e, .f (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 91 and J.R. No. 7). 
134   E.g., State v. Tyriq T., No. 2803777, 2012 WL 6582550, at *2 n.9 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 15, 2012) (quoting Wikipedia.com); In re Hessney, 16 N.Y.S.3d 918, 921 (N.Y. 
County Ct. 2015) (referencing testimony of part-time sheriff deputy); Michael S. 
Obermeier, Comment, Scoping Out the Limits of “Arms” Under the Second Amendment, 
60 U. KAN. L. REV. 681, 699 n.136 (2012) Cf. People v. Baillie, No. E050832, 2011 WL 
675974, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2011) (“If a hollow point projectile ‘mushroom[ed] 
out,’ it might slow down enough to stop inside a person.”). 
135   State v. Aitken, No. A–0467–10T4, 2012 WL 1057954, at *16 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Mar. 30, 2012) (affirming a conviction where the ammunition was found in 
the defendant’s car while at his dwelling, rejecting the argument that an exception for 
transport between dwellings should be supplied by the court; reversing conviction for 
possession of larger capacity magazine because a witness “was not qualified to testify 
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The Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2003, S. 253, is 
designed to protect officers and their families from vindictive 
criminals . . . .136 
Moreover, loading and unloading the firearm in a public location would 
create alarm.137 In sum, this plodding interpretation would 
anomalously frustrate firearms possession of the type the act was 
designed to allow. 
3. Purpose to Allow Carrying Anywhere in the United States. The 
five sentence Purpose and Summary of LEOSA, provided in the House 
report, states: “H.R. 218, the ‘Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 
2003,’ would override State laws and mandate that retired and active 
police officers could carry a concealed weapon anywhere within the 
United States.”138 There are numerous other references in the report to 
the act authorizing possession “anywhere in the United States,” by both 
supporters and opponents of the act.139 
                                            
136   S. Rep. No. 108–29, at 4 (2003). The report continues, noting an additional 
purpose to allow “certified law enforcement officers . . . to carry concealed firearms in 
situations where they can respond immediately to a crime across state and other 
jurisdictional lines.” Id. 
137   Users also might not be inclined to do so for fear it would adversely affect the 
functionality of the ammunition. E.g., Richard, Ammunition Failure Warning, Blue 
Sheepdog (reporting a Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Department training bulletin as 
stating “[T]he cause of the misfire was determined to be from the primer mix being 
knocked out of the primer when the round was cycled through the firearm multiple 
times.”), http://www.bluesheepdog.com/2012/03/08/ammunition-failure-warning/ (visited 
July 24, 2017). 
138   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 3 (2004). 
139   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 22 (2004) (stating LEOSA would “mandate that 
retired and active police officers carry a concealed weapon anywhere within the United 
States”) (statement of Rep. Coble); id. (“The legislation is fairly broad in some areas. It 
allows current and retired State and local law enforcement officers to carry a concealed 
weapon anywhere in the country.”) (statement of Rep. Coble); id. (“H.R. 218 would 
override States’ right-to-carry laws and mandate that retired and active police officers 
could carry a concealed weapon anywhere within the United States.”) (statement of 
Rep. Sensenbrenner); id. at 79 (“H.R. 218 would override State ‘right to carry’ laws and 
mandate that retired and active police officers could carry a concealed weapon 
anywhere within the United States.”) (Dissenting Views of Reps. Sensenbrenner and 
Flake); id. at 80 (“These officers, while performing an admirable service, will not 
necessarily have the experience of the beat police officer, yet, this legislation insists we 
allow them the same authority to carry concealed weapons anywhere in the country.”) 




 FIREARMS LEGISLATION & FEDERALISM CONCERNS  35 
   
Legislative history from the Senate is less clear in this regard. The 
body text of the summarized purposes, reproduced in full in the 
margin,140 states the act “does not seek to supersede Federal law,” 
without explicit reference to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and notes 
state firearms law was previously preempted in part by the Armored 
Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993.141 That report does not, however, 
indicate that the unaffected federal law extends beyond those 
provisions in federal law the statute explicitly references (ammunition 
prohibited by federal law and federal regulation of fully automatic 
weapons, silencers and destructive devices).142  
The character string “school” appears four times in that report; all 
are in part of the dissenting views of Senator Kennedy. In three 
locations, the report makes reference to extant state restrictions on 
firearms possession in schools; and in the fourth, it makes reference to 
a rejected amendment that would have preserved state restrictions in 
schools and other locations.143 No mention is made of subjecting persons 
                                            
140   The report states: 
The purpose of S. 253, the ‘‘Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2003,’’ is 
to amend title 18, United States Code, to authorize qualified off-duty law 
enforcement officers and qualified retired law enforcement officers carrying 
photographic identification issued by a governmental agency for which the 
individual is, or was, employed as a law enforcement officer, notwithstanding 
State or local laws, to carry a concealed firearm that has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. This Act, however, does not seek 
to supersede Federal law or limit the laws of any State that permit private 
persons or entities to prohibit or restrict the possession of concealed firearms on 
their property; or prohibits or restricts the possession of firearms on any State or 
local government property, installation, building, base, or park. 
S. Rep. No. 108–29, at 3 (2003). 
141   Id. (referencing the Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103–55, 107 Stat. 276 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5901–5904 (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 115–40))). 
142   18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(e), 926C(e) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
143   The four statements are all on the same page, S. Rep. No. 108–29, at 13 (2003): 
 (i) “They have offered no explanation why Congress is better suited than 
states, cities, and towns to decide how to best protect police officers, 
schoolchildren, church-goers, and other members of their communities.” 
 (ii) “I also offered an amendment to preserve state and local laws that 
prohibit concealed weapons in churches, schools, bars and other places where 
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qualified under LEOSA to federal prohibitions in the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act.  
Of course, a need to preserve state restrictions on firearms in private 
schools would have been moot if LEOSA does not authorize possession 
within 1000 feet of a school. That Senate report, then, cannot fairly be 
understood as reflecting a conscious determination not to allow persons 
qualified under LEOSA to possess firearms in areas regulated by the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act. In fact, the discussion of the referenced 
rejected amendment indicates the converse — that the act, by virtue of 
not having been so amended, would allow firearms possession by 
persons under LEOSA in school zones (although not on public school 
property itself) without the authorization of the corresponding state. 
4. Ambiguity in Gun-Free School Zones Act Concerning Entity 
Issuing Licensure. The question then becomes whether the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act is sufficiently unambiguous so as to prevent its 
interpretation to give effect to these purposes — to allow general 
carrying of a firearm for self-defense by law enforcement officers and 
retireees. For those who emphasize textualism, a starting point would 
be, one supposes, the definition of “by,” because the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act references one “licensed to do so by the State in which the 
school zone is located.”144 One can find numerous definitions of “by” that 
are not limited to a meaning of “through the agency of,” such as “in the 
general region of,” “in the matter of” and “with respect to.”145 
                                                                                                              
states, cities, and towns, these places are singled out as deserving special 
protection from the threat of gun violence.” 
 (iii) “Michigan has a law that prohibits concealed firearms in schools, 
sports arenas, bars, churches, and hospitals.” 
 (iv) “Kentucky prohibits carrying concealed firearms in bars and schools. 
South Carolina prohibits concealed firearms in churches and hospitals.” 
144   See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
145   WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 307 (2002), includes the following in its definition of “by”: 
1 . . .  b : in the general region of <they commonly commanded both ~ sea and 
land — John & William Langhorne> 2 . . . b . . . (2) : at or into (as another’s 
house) on passing <he came ~ the house for a few minutes yesterday>  . . . 7 . . . b 
: on the basis of (as a distinction or classification) : in the matter of : with respect 
to <a Kansan ~ birth> <a lawyer ~ profession> 8 a : in or to the amount or extent 
of — used in expressions involving comparison to indicate an amount or degree 
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One might assert that “through the agency of” is the best literal 
reading of “by,” in the phrase “licensed to do so by the State,” when one 
focuses solely on those seven words. The litigation in King v. Burwell,146 
involving interpretation of the phrase “established by the State under 
section 1311,” as used in the Affordable Care Act, provides helpful 
insight. Professors Eskridge, Ferejohn, Fried, Manheim and Strauss 
wrote in an amicus brief in King v. Burwell concerning construction of 
the phrase “established by the State under section 1311”: 
The broader problem, however, is not that Petitioners’ responses 
to those provisions are unpersuasive; it’s that they ignore the 
“cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole.” Petitioners 
start — and end — by looking to Section 36B’s seven words, and 
conclude that those seven words, read in isolation, unambiguously 
forbid the IRS from providing tax credits to customers who 
purchase plans on the HHS-created exchanges. To the extent that 
they look to the other provisions of the ACA at all, they do so only 
to ask whether those provisions would be rendered “patently 
absurd” under their theory. 
But the whole-text canon doesn’t authorize courts to interpret 
seven words in isolation and then ask whether that interpretation 
renders other statutory provisions absurd. Rather, courts must 
interpret a provision in the first instance in light [sic] its context 
and place in the statutory scheme. Statutory construction, after 
all, is a “holistic endeavor.” So the question here isn’t just whether 
Petitioners’ reading of Section 36B renders absurd the various 
provisions discussed above. Rather, the question is this: What 
does the ACA, read as a whole, say about tax credits when you 
take into account all its provisions?147 
In that litigation, the United States rejected the argument that 
“established by” refers to action through the agency of the named locale. 
The Government argued the phrase “serves to identify the Exchange in 
                                                                                                              
weight <won the race ~ two yards> <missed the train ~ five minutes> <carried 
his ward ~ 80 votes> <lighter ~ six pounds> <better ~ far> . . . . 
146   King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2482 (2015). 
147   Brief of William N. Eskridge et al. in Support of Respondents at 2, 18–19, King 
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14–114), 2015 WL 428994 at *2, 18–19) (quoting 
King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991); United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. 
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a particular State. Its presence or absence in the Act’s provisions 
reflects style and grammar — not a substantive limitation on the type 
of Exchange at issue.”148 By analogy, one might assert that the 
reference in the Gun-Free School Zones Act to one being licensed “by” a 
jurisdiction involves mere identification the location where one can 
possess a firearm (akin to the first-reproduced definition of “by”149 as 
meaning “in the general region of”, as in the phrase “they commonly 
commanded both by sea and land;” or as in “in the matter of” or “with 
respect to,” as in “a lawyer by profession”150). 
Assorted authority supports the view that interpretation focused on 
a disembodied literal reading of a specific phrase is improper.151 For 
                                            
148   Brief for the Respondents at 33, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14–
114), 2015 WL 349885 at *33. 
149   See supra note 145. 
150   See supra note 145. 
151   For example, Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993), states, 
“Petitioner’s contention overlooks, we think, this fundamental principle of statutory 
construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be 
determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” 
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 
415 (2005), states, “Statutory language has meaning only in context . . . .” 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014), states: 
“[R]easonable statutory interpretation must account for both “the specific context 
in which . . . language is used” and “the broader context of the statute as a 
whole.” A statutory “provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often 
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the 
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the 
rest of the law.” Thus, an agency interpretation that is “inconsisten[t] with the 
design and structure of the statute as a whole” does not merit deference. 
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); United Sav. Assn. of 
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); University 
of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2529 (2013)). 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000), states in 
part: 
In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at 
issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular 
statutory provision in isolation. The meaning — or ambiguity — of certain words 
or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. It is a “fundamental 
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” A court 
must therefore interpret the statute “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory 
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example, the Supreme Court has reached the following statutory 
interpretations: 
• the term “employee” includes a former employee;152 
• the term “person” includes only natural persons, thereby 
excluding entities from those who may proceed in forma 
pauperis, notwithstanding a definition in the Dictionary 
Act153 that the word “person” includes assorted entities;154 
• the term “original sentence,” when used in connection with 
resentencing someone who violated probation, references 
instead the maximum sentence in a range provided by 
sentencing guidelines;155 
• the term “tangible object” excludes fish (in the context, it is 
limited to items “used to record or preserve information”);156 
and 
• a statute prohibiting the “deport[ation] or return” of an alien 
does not prohibit the return of persons intercepted outside 
U.S. territorial waters.157 
                                                                                                              
meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where 
Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.  
Id. (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); Gustafson v. 
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995); FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 
(1959)) (citations omitted). 
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) states: 
Although the State’s hypertechnical reading of the nondiscrimination clause 
is not inconsistent with the language of that provision examined in isolation, 
statutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon 
of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. 
152   Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
153   1 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), amended by 21st Century Language Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112–231, 126 Stat. 1619 (2012) (amending other definitions). 
154   Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 
194, 196, 199 (1993). 
155   United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54, 56–57 (1994). 
156   Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1079 (2015) (announcing the judgment 
of the court, in an opinion joined by three other justices). 
157   Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 170–71, 173 (1993); id. at 
188–89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Today’s majority nevertheless decides that the 
forced repatriation of the Haitian refugees is perfectly legal, because the word ‘return’ 
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So, although it might well be the best literal interpretation of “licensed 
to do so by [a particular] State” as a detached sentence fragment to 
limit that to persons having received authorization directly through the 
agency of that particular state, that it not the relevant inquiry.  
Thoughtfulness in avoiding literal interpretation of individual 
sentence fragments in light of the entire statutory context is of 
increased importance where one is considering the interaction of 
multiple statutes, particularly statutory language enacted at different 
times. Although interpretative doctrine provides that repeals by 
implication are disfavored, even a textualist can state as to that 
principle: “This classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted 
over time, and getting them to ‘make sense’ in combination, necessarily 
                                                                                                              
the United States, and because the official charged with controlling immigration has no 
role in enforcing an order to control immigration.” (citations omitted)). 
A discussion by Popkin would urge inclusion of United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 
219 (1941), in this list. He states, “Finally, in United States v. Hutcheson, Justice 
Frankfurter engaged in what the dissent called ‘a process of construction never . . . 
heretofore indulged by this Court,’ by interpreting a later statute denying a labor 
injunction to be an implicit repeal of a prior criminal statute.” William D. Popkin, An 
“Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. 
REV. 1133, 1152 (1992) (footnote omitted) (quoting Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 245 (Roberts, 
J., dissenting)). Hutcheson may well not be a good candidate. The main opinion notes 
statutory language, not referenced in the dissent, that makes the case more supportable 
by noting the latter statute: “also relieved such practices of all illegal taint by the catch-
all provision, ‘nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held 
to be violations of any law of the United States.’” Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 230 (majority 
opinion). 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892), is the 
fashionable reference to interpretation rejecting textualism. There, the court holds that 
a statute prohibiting contractual assistance of migrations of aliens “to perform labor or 
service of any kind in the United States,” subject to specific exceptions including 
“professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants,” id. at 458–59, 
does not prohibit a contract for an alien to serve as a rector and pastor. Id. at 457–58. In 
reaching the conclusion, the court notes, “So far, then, as the evil which was sought to 
be remedied interprets the statute, it also guides to an exclusion of this contract from 
the penalties of the act.” Id. at 464.  
Providing a counterpoint for that case, “[A]s the second Mr. Justice Harlan said, 
when speaking for the Court in another context, a statute ‘is not an empty vessel into 
which this Court is free to pour a vintage that we think better suits present-day tastes.’ 
Considerations of this kind are for the Congress, not the courts.” Nat’l Broiler Mktg. 
Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827 (1978) (quoting United States v. Sisson, 399 
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assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the 
implications of a later statute.”158 Even if the understanding of one 
definition of “by” in the Gun-Free School Zones Act would have been 
most reasonable when the act was adopted, the relevant question for 
our purposes is whether that choice is so required that, to enact rights 
contemplated by LEOSA, it was necessary to re-write that existing 
statutory language not otherwise amended by LEOSA (in addition to 
adding new language of LEOSA itself). 
An interesting illustration is provided by Holland v. 
Commonwealth.159 A Kentucky law limiting parole eligibility of violent 
offenders has an exception for “a person who has been determined by a 
court to have been a victim of domestic violence or abuse pursuant to 
KRS 533.060 with regard to the offenses involving the death of the 
victim or serious physical injury to the victim.”160 The cited section of 
the Kentucky Revised Statutes allows eligibility for probation or 
conditional release to a person convicted of certain crimes where “the 
commission of the offense involved the use of a weapon from which a 
shot or projectile may be discharged” where he or she “establishes that 
the person against whom the weapon was used had previously or was 
then engaged in an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse.”161  
In sum, the literal terms of these statutes restrict the benefits of 
parole eligibility to a domestic violence victim who had used a firearm 
or similar device. Nevertheless, the court holds that a domestic violence 
victim who did not use a firearm, but rather burned an abuser with 
gasoline she ignited, could benefit from the exception.162 The court 
notes, “It is elementary that each section of a legislative act should be 
read in light of the act as a whole; with a view to making it harmonize, 
if possible, with the entire act, and with each section and provision 
thereof, as well as with the expressed legislative intent and policy.”163 
                                            
158   United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (citations omitted) (Scalia, J.). 
159   192 S.W.3d 433 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005). See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, THE 
JUDICIAL ROLE: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION & THE PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL PARTNER 129 
n.91 (discussing Holland). 
160   KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.3401 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
161   KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.060(1) (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
162   192 S.W.3d at 435, 437. 
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5. Application of These Interpretative Principles; Interpretation in 
pari materia with Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993. The 
purposes of LEOSA are to allow active and retired law enforcement 
officials to protect themselves from retaliation (and to facilitate these 
persons’ acts insofar as they would wish assist in law enforcement while 
not on-duty). That these purposes are objectives is patent from the 
structure of the act, and is confirmed by the legislative history.164 
Realization of those goals is eviscerated if LEOSA does not authorize 
possession in wide swaths of the country; that would substantially 
impede the ability to exercise the rights LEOSA creates.  
Moreover, as noted above,165 the Senate report on LEOSA makes 
explicit reference to the Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 
1993.166 That act, like LEOSA, does not mention the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act. It states qualified personnel having a license “in the State in 
which such member is primarily employed,” subject to additional terms, 
“shall be entitled to lawfully carry any weapon to which such license 
relates and function as an armored car crew member in any State while 
such member is acting in the service of such company.”167 It has an 
express preemption provision, which states in full, “This chapter shall 
supersede any provision of State law (or the law of any political 
subdivision of a State) that is inconsistent with this chapter.”168 It 
makes no reference to restricting application of federal law.  
In terms of whether the federal authorization is sufficient to 
authorize a firearm in a school zone, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the statutory language in LEOSA and the Armored Car 
Industry Reciprocity Act.169 If the language in LEOSA is insufficient to 
authorize firearms possession in school zones, as restricted by the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, the Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act is 
likely also insufficient. And that would necessarily produce absurd 
results. As so construed, the Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act 
                                            
164   See supra notes 136–143 and infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
165   See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
166   Pub. L. No. 103–55, 107 Stat. 276 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 5901–5904 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40)). 
167    15 U.S.C. § 5902. 
168    15 U.S.C. § 5903. 
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would be ineffective in allowing armored car personnel’s possession of 
loaded weapons when visiting a customer within 1,000 feet of a school, 
and it would require repeated loading and unloading of weapons 
throughout the day if it was to be effective in locations outside a school 
zone.  
E. Conclusion. 
This Part II collects some of the ways in which rights sought to be 
preserved by LEOSA have been or may be fettered. We have 
encountered rather patent violations — a clearly preempted prohibition 
on carrying particular ammunition — and we have seen authority 
stating that local restrictions on firearm features are not preempted, 
though, for a variety of reasons, that is an unsustainable interpretation 
of LEOSA. We have encountered attempts to limit the type of officer 
who may benefit from LEOSA. And we have seen governmental 
interpretations that would render ineffectual the rights LEOSA 
endeavors to create, through unsupported conclusions one possessing a 
firearm under LEOSA remains subject to the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act.  
Part III turns to the extent to which these rights may be 
affirmatively vindicated. This is of significant importance if the rights 
are to be used as intended. If contumacious disregard of the federal law 
cannot be remedied prospectively, there is a significant likelihood the 
exercise will be chilled. 
III. PRIVATE RIGHTS 
Litigation concerning the scope of LEOSA can arise in a number of 
contexts. An individual charged with violating state or local law 
prohibiting firearms possession may assert rights under the act as a 
defense. Alternatively, a private person may rely on the act in seeking 
affirmative relief, whether monetary damages for a violation or 
prospective relief for assistance in acquisition of the necessary 
credentials, to prohibit a state or local government official’s taking acts 
inconsistent with LEOSA or to require training of state or local officials 
concerning LEOSA compliance. 
LEOSA is not express concerning whether, or the extent to which, a 
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Whether there is such a right implicates a number of theories: (i) the 
possible implication of a private right of action under Cort v. Ash;170 (ii) 
creation of a “right” enforceable under section 1983 of title 42; and (iii) 
claims seeking a declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act171 or a state statute.  
We shall cabin our discussion to the following theories of relief: (a) 
state principles addressing a property right to a credential; (b) implied 
rights of action under LEOSA; and (c) section 1983. This choice reflects, 
simply, the primary theories that have been litigated. As we shall see, 
where a federal statute’s language focuses on providing rights to an 
identified group (as opposed to commanding governmental action), a 
right recognized under section 1983 is often found to exist,172 which 
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that a remedy is available under 
section 1983.173 But, with the exception of a recent District of Columbia 
circuit opinion,174 courts typically have been reluctant to allow claims 
for relief under section 1983. 
A. Commandeering.  
It is convenient to examine the extent to which federalism concerns 
may operate to restrict rights under LEOSA before examining the 
existence of an ability to seek affirmative relief. Printz v. United 
States175 involves a statute requiring that, for handgun sales by dealers 
in a state not having a background check, local law enforcement “make 
a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt 
                                            
170   422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
171   28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). The issue might 
also ultimately be presented by virtue of the inherent equitable power of a court. See 
generally Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (“[W]e 
have long held that federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief 
against state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal law. But that has 
been true not only with respect to violations of federal law by state officials, but also 
with respect to violations of federal law by federal officials. Thus, the Supremacy Clause 
need not be (and in light of our textual analysis above, cannot be) the explanation. What 
our cases demonstrate is that, ‘in a proper case, relief may be given in a court of 
equity  . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.’” (citations omitted) (quoting 
Carroll v. Safford, 3 How. 441, 463, 11 L.Ed. 671 (1845)). 
172   See infra notes 223–225 and accompanying text. 
173   See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
174   DuBerry v. District of Columbia, 824 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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or possession would be in violation of the law, including research in 
whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a 
national system designated by the Attorney General.”176 In concluding 
the statute is infirm, the Supreme Court notes that the Constitution 
obligates the President to execute Federal law.177 It continues: 
The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to 
thousands of CLEOs[, chief law enforcement officers,] in the 50 
States, who are left to implement the program without 
meaningful Presidential control (if indeed meaningful 
Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint 
and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the 
Federal Executive — to ensure both vigor and accountability — 
is well known. That unity would be shattered, and the power of 
the President would be subject to reduction, if Congress could 
act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply 
requiring state officers to execute its laws.178 
The Court concludes it does not make a difference whether the 
federal statute directs the states themselves or their officers.179 And it 
concludes balancing of burdens on the state, compared to the benefits of 
the act, is improper where the object of the federal statute is to “direct 
                                            
176   521 U.S. at 903. The statute excluded officers in states that developed an 
instant background check system or that issued handgun permits after a statutorily-
described background check. 521 U.S. at 903. 
177   See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: 
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2181 (1998) (discussing the historical 
support for, and lack of support for, the holding in Printz); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: 
Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government 
Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1603–04 (2012) (discussing the 
possibility that vesting of executive powers in States as “encroaching on the president's 
duty to superintend the implementation of federal law”). 
178   521 U.S. at 922–23 (citations omitted). Gerken describes the commandeering 
principles as follows: “The prohibition on commandeering may be fuzzy at the edges, but 
it’s a workable rule that corresponds to a basic intuition: Congress can’t take over 
states’ governing apparatuses and force them to do its bidding.” Heather K. Gerken, 
Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 101 (2014). 
179   521 U.S. at 930 (“The Brady Act, the dissent asserts, is different from the “take 
title” provisions invalidated in New York because the former is addressed to individuals 
— namely, CLEOs — while the latter were directed to the State itself. That is certainly 
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the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the 
structural framework of dual sovereignty,” as opposed to merely 
imposing an incidental burden on it.180 
The restrictions on commandeering announced in Printz may appear 
to prohibit all affirmative relief seeking assistance with obtaining the 
required credentials from state or local governments (excluding, 
potentially, the District of Columbia).181 In fact, a few cases considering 
challenges to failure to provide credentials have relied on this principle 
in concluding a remedy was not available. However, a more thorough 
understanding of the Supreme Court authority eliminates much of the 
concern. 
Zarrelli v. Rabner182 involves a complainant who had passed the 
state’s firearms requalification program, but to whom New Jersey 
declined to issue a certification.183 At that time, LEOSA required retiree 
firearms testing and its certification “by the State” or the agency from 
which he or she retired.184 The statute was amended a few years later 
to allow testing and certification “by a certified firearms instructor that 
is qualified to conduct a firearms qualification test for active duty 
officers within that State” as an alternative.185 The state already had in 
effect a licensing program for retirees, though the complainant 
evidently did not qualify for that because, inter alia, he retired from an 
out-of-state position.186 As noted, what the complainant required in 
                                            
180   521 U.S. at 931–32. 
181 DuBerry v. District of Columbia, 824 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2016), summarily 
rejects application of Printz to commandeering of the District of Columbia. Id. at 1057 
(“[The District of Columbia’s] reliance on the anti-commandeering doctrine appears to 
be misplaced; at least it cites no authority that the doctrine is applicable to it.” (citation 
omitted)). 
182   No. A–5511–05T2, 2007 WL 1284947 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 3, 2007). 
183   Id. at *1. 
184   Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, § 3, Pub. L. No. 108–277, 118 
Stat. 865 (2004) (prior to 2010 and 2013). 
185   See Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Improvements Act of 2010, 
§ 2(c)(2)(B)(ii), Pub. L. No. 111–272, 124 Stat. 2855 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 926B(e)(2), 926C(e)(1)(a)). 
186   The applicant had been a New York court officer. Zarrelli, 2007 WL 1284947 at 
*1. It appears the relevant statutory language restricted issuance of credentials to a 
retiree: 
who was regularly employed as a full–time member of the State Police; a full–
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Zarrelli was merely communication of information, not compulsion of 
the state’s testing him.  
The Zarrelli court summarily asserts the federal government cannot 
commandeer the states and quotes a fragment from Printz out of 
context. The court states, “It is immaterial, however, that a federal 
enactment ‘places a minimal and only temporary burden upon state 
officers.’”187 Printz, however, restricts the conclusion that the extent of 
the burden is immaterial to circumstances where “it is the whole object 
of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to 
compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty,” only stating 
that in that case, “such a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate.”188  
The precise meaning of this limitation in Printz is not self-evident 
from the sentence itself. But some clarification may be provided by 
focusing on the rather peculiar nature of the duties imposed by the act 
                                                                                                              
municipal police department in this State; a full–time member of a State law 
enforcement agency; a full–time sheriff, undersheriff or sheriff’s officer of a 
county of this State; a full–time State or county corrections officer; a full–time 
county park police officer; a full–time county prosecutor’s detective or 
investigator; or a full–time federal law enforcement officer . . . . 
Prevention—Cruelty—Animals, 2005 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 372 § 14 (Assembly 
3186) (Westlaw). 
187   2007 WL 1284947, at *3 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 932). The court’s analysis, 
in full, is as follows: 
It is settled that Congress cannot compel officers of one State to implement 
federal programs. Printz v. United States is illustrative. In Printz, the Supreme 
Court struck down certain portions of the Brady Act which required local law 
enforcement officials to investigate prospective handgun purchasers. The Court 
ruled that Congress could not “force[ ] participation of the States' executive in 
the actual administration of a federal program.” 
Plaintiff argues that in light of the fact that New Jersey already has its own 
certification program for retired law enforcement officers under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6, 
it would not be at all burdensome for New Jersey to create a certification 
program under the Act. It is immaterial, however, that a federal enactment 
“places a minimal and only temporary burden upon state officers.” Rather, “[i]t is 
the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no 
comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental 
defect.” That New Jersey may have the authority under the Act to issue such a 
certification does not mean that it has the obligation to do so. 
Zarrelli, 2007 WL 1284947, at *2–3 (citations omitted) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 918, 
932). 
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addressed in Printz. The statute at issue did not require the local chief 
law enforcement officer to communicate information to anyone. So, 
Printz does not address a federal obligation to disclose information, as 
the opinion itself expressly notes.189 (And some lower courts have 
concluded that the proscription on commandeering does not extend to 
the provision of information.190) Rather, the statute required officials in 
                                            
189   Printz, 521 U.S. at 918 (stating regulations “which require only the provision of 
information to the Federal Government, do not involve the precise issue before us here, 
which is the forced participation of the States’ executive in the actual administration of 
a federal program. We of course do not address these or other currently operative 
enactments that are not before us; it will be time enough to do so if and when their 
validity is challenged in a proper case.”). See also id. at 935 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“In addition, the Court appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely 
ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5779(a) (requiring state and local law enforcement agencies to report cases of missing 
children to the Department of Justice). The provisions invalidated here, however, which 
directly compel state officials to administer a federal regulatory program, utterly fail to 
adhere to the design and structure of our constitutional scheme.”). 
190   Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(stating, in validating a federal statute requiring information to be forwarded to the 
federal government, “[H]ealth care providers are required to collect and report 
information to the State Board of Medical Examiners. The State Board of Medical 
Examiners then forwards that information to a federal data bank. But more is required 
than the expenditure of time and effort on the part of state officials in order to offend 
the Tenth Amendment.”); see also Freilich v. Bd. of Directors of Upper Chesapeake 
Health, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 679, 695 (D. Md. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Freilich v. Upper 
Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating the act “established a 
national reporting system which, among other things, requires hospitals to provide 
information about adverse professional review actions ….”); Pierson v. Orlando Reg’l 
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (agreeing with the 
Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Freilich’s of application of the Tenth Amendment), aff’d, 
451 F. App’x 862 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Brown, No. 07 CR 485 (HB), 2007 
WL 4372829, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007), aff’d, 328 F. App’x 57 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(stating, as to a federal act that “merely requires state officials to provide information 
regarding sexual offenders-information that the state officials will typically already 
have through their own state registries-to the federal government,” “In sum, because 
the individuals subject to the Act are already required to register pursuant to state 
registration laws, and because the Act only requires states to provide information 
rather than administer or enforce a federal program, the Act does not violate the Tenth 
Amendment.”). See generally Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the 
Federal Government, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 139 (2012) (discussing Freilich and Brown 
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states not having an existing background check to make a reasonable 
effort to determine whether the transaction “would be in violation of the 
law,” without imposing any obligation to do anything if so.191 
In sum, the act required local law enforcement officers to investigate 
(monitor) the potential illegality of a pending transaction. One objective 
apparently implicit in that forced monitoring is to influence law 
enforcement activities — to enforce prohibitions against persons these 
searches identify.  
LEOSA cannot be categorized as having its “whole object” 
influencing state enforcement of existing criminal proscriptions, as in 
requiring local officials inform themselves concerning the details of a 
particular set of ongoing activities by private persons. Rather, LEOSA’s 
objectives include prohibiting states and localities from criminalizing 
certain interstate conduct (and, as part of that, allowing individuals to 
have confirmation of factual information, in the possession of states, 
that evidences the legality of their freedom from state and local 
prosecution). So, the proscription announced in Printz on imposing 
minimal burdens on states is inapplicable to claims of right under 
LEOSA. 
                                                                                                              
notion that providing information in any way constitutes assisting the enforcement of a 
federal regulatory program.”). 
191   The Court summarizes as follows the act’s requirements for states that did not 
have a background check process: 
When a CLEO receives the required notice of a proposed transfer from the 
firearms dealer, the CLEO must “make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 
business days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, 
including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are 
available and in a national system designated by the Attorney General.” 
§ 922(s)(2). The Act does not require the CLEO to take any particular action if he 
determines that a pending transaction would be unlawful; he may notify the 
firearms dealer to that effect, but is not required to do so. If, however, the CLEO 
notifies a gun dealer that a prospective purchaser is ineligible to receive a 
handgun, he must, upon request, provide the would-be purchaser with a written 
statement of the reasons for that determination. § 922(s)(6)(C). Moreover, if the 
CLEO does not discover any basis for objecting to the sale, he must destroy any 
records in his possession relating to the transfer, including his copy of the Brady 
Form.  
Printz, 521 U.S. at 903–04. Moreover, where no prohibiting circumstances were found, 
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Johnson v. New York State Department of Correctional Services192 
also relies on Printz,193 and similarly elides these important 
distinctions. Although Printz indicates otherwise de minimis burdens 
on states are not validated where the “whole object” of the federal act is 
to direct the functioning of the state executive,194 in applying the 
standard the Johnson court (i) drops the qualifier “whole” and (ii) does 
not attempt to address the meaning of “to direct the functioning of the 
state executive.”195 Johnson’s analysis without explanation extends the 
proscription on commandeering. 
Reno v. Condon196 identifies a second relevant restriction on the 
scope of commandeering prohibited by Printz. Reno limits the 
prohibition on commandeering to federal regulation that “require[s] the 
States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens,” 
otherwise referenced as “requir[ing] state officials to assist in the 
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”197  
Reno involves a federal statute that “restricts the States’ ability to 
disclose a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent”198 
and that “requires disclosure of personal information ‘for use in 
connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, 
motor vehicle emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, 
[etc.] . . . .”199 The Court, focusing on the restrictions on disclosure of 
information, finds that the federal act is not invalid commandeering. 
The opinion for a unanimous court states: 
It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any 
laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist 
in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private 
individuals. We accordingly conclude that the DPPA is consistent 
                                            
192   709 F. Supp. 2d 178 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). 
193   Id. at 187. 
194   See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
195   See Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 187 (stating, in a conclusory fashion, “Even if 
plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that LEOSA established a federal mandate for state 
officers to issue the identification described in subsection (d), the extent of the burden 
placed upon the state officers would make no difference because the object of the law 
would then be to ‘direct the functioning of the state executive.’”). 
196   Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
197   Id. at 151. 
198   Id. at 144. 
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with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and 
Printz.200 
LEOSA may be similarly characterized as not concerning the 
“regulat[ion of] private individuals” but, rather, restricting the actions 
of states in regulating interstate commerce, namely restricting the 
extent to which states and localities may regulate private persons 
carrying firearms interstate. LEOSA is ultimately about preempting 
state and local regulation. Insofar as a challenge involves the 
information-providing portions of LEOSA credentialing, a claim that 
requiring the disclosure would violate federalism norms is inconsistent 
with two separate limits to the commandeering doctrine. The 
proscription on commandeering (i) does not extend to the minor, 
ancillary, ministerial act of providing information and (ii) does not 
extend beyond attempts to regulate private individuals.  
Whether LEOSA could be construed as lawfully requiring states to 
do firearms testing of individuals is less certain. One supposes the issue 
of diminished importance as a result of changes made to LEOSA in 
2010. Initially, the act required the firearms testing, and certification of 
the testing, for a retiree be either by the agency from which he or she 
retired or his or her state of residence.201 As of 2010, the testing and 
certification can be from one who is “a certified firearms instructor that 
is qualified to conduct a firearms qualification test for active duty 
officers within that State.”202  
But, if there is a challenge from a retiree who asserts he has a right 
to compel testing, the statute as so construed203 would, one supposes, 
not violate federalism norms on the limited basis that it did not involve 
compelling the “regulat[ion of] private individuals.” Most analogous 
would be South Carolina v. Baker,204 where the Supreme Court upholds 
a federal prohibition on state issuance of securities in bearer form — a 
                                            
200   Id. at 151 (referencing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)). 
201   18 U.S.C. § 926C(d)(1), (2)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
202   Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act Improvements Act of 2010, § 2(c)(2)(B)(ii), 
Pub. L. No. 111–272, 124 Stat. 2855 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(e)(2), 
926C(e)(1)(a)). 
203   This likelihood seems sufficiently remote not to warrant discussion of whether 
such a construction is proper. 
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prohibition that necessarily imposes on the states an obligation to 
perform the administrative tasks associated with maintaining 
registered ownership of bonds. That would include maintaining, or 
requiring someone else maintain, a register of ownership and 
processing transfers of registration,205 which although apparently 
perfunctory can nevertheless be troublesome to execute206 and 
burdensome.207 The Court indicates this kind of regulation of state 
activity is not prohibited: 
Such “commandeering” is, however, an inevitable consequence of 
regulating a state activity. Any federal regulation demands 
compliance. That a State wishing to engage in certain activity 
must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to 
comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a 
commonplace that presents no constitutional defect.208  
Reno v. Condon harmonizes the Court’s authority concerning 
commandeering by noting the statute at issue in South Carolina v. 
Baker “ ‘regulate[d] state activities,’ rather than ‘seek[ing] to control or 
influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.’”209 
Thus, that creation of an affirmative right to a remedy for denial of a 
LEOSA credential might involve administrative action that would not 
otherwise be taken, then, does not compel the conclusion that it 
involves unconstitutional commandeering. LEOSA regulates — 
restricts — state activities; it does not affirmatively control or direct the 
manner in which states regulate private persons. And the federal 
                                            
205   See generally WILLIAM CAMPBELL RIES, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT AND FIDUCIARY SERVICES § 12:20 (Westlaw through July 2016). 
206   E.g., SEC Obtains Million Dollar Penalty and Cease and Desist Order Against 
the Chase Manhattan Bank, SEC News Digest 2001–184, 2001 WL 1113149, at *1 
(Sept. 24, 2001) (referencing $1 million fine arising from initial inaccuracies of $46.8 
billion as transfer agent for corporate and municipal bond issues identified in 1998, 
which were not reconciled until June 2000, resulting in reserves of $45.8 million, with 
about $28.8 million resulting from payment errors). 
207   Exceptions to the Report of the Special Master and Brief in Support, South 
Carolina v. Dole, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (No. 94, Orig.), 1987 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
1315, at *66 (citing evidence that, for issuances of $10 million or less, which are 
identified as representing “most” bond issuances, “registration raises ongoing 
administrative costs significantly over the life of those issues”). 
208   485 U.S. 505, 514–15 (1988). 
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command approved by the Supreme Court in Baker necessarily involves 
individuals be delivered information (a physical certificate representing 
ownership or other confirmation of ownership upon transfer). So, Baker 
rejects the position that it is unlawful commandeering for a federal act 
to mandate, as an ancillary component, the ministerial state act of 
delivering information. 
B. Private Right of Action. 
LEOSA necessarily affords a defense to a qualifying, credentialed 
person charged with violation of state or local law restricting firearms 
possession that is preempted by LEOSA. But there are broader 
potential uses of LEOSA. A person may seek to assert a claim for 
failure to assist in the acquisition of credentials necessary to benefit. A 
qualifying, credentialed person might seek to enjoin acts made unlawful 
by LEOSA (e.g., may seek to enjoin enforcement of a contumacious 
policy banning ammunition clearly protected by LEOSA), or seek to 
require training for LEOSA compliance, so that holders of required 
credentials would not be subject to arrest in the first instance. Or a 
person aggrieved by actions in violation of LEOSA might seek damages. 
Whether there is a cause of action that would allow these types of 
remedies to be available is somewhat complex. They could be available 
under either state or federal law. We can first turn to state-law 
theories. As we shall see, state-law theories have generally focused on 
credentialing. In general, those claims have failed, with a notable 
exception as to a person who was denied new credentials to replace 
previously issued ones that had been physically broken. 
After briefly discussing the state theories, we shall turn to the 
federal theories of recovery that typically have been litigated. We shall 
examine principles of implied rights of action (which have been 
unsuccessful) and section 1983 of title 42, which provides for a remedy 
for violation of federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. 
A 2016 opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia holds LEOSA does create a right remediable under section 
1983, conflicting with, inter alia, earlier authority from the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York. The better answer would 
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However, even if there is such a right, certain details of the judicial 
gloss applied to section 1983 can operate to prevent vindication of 
rights. Although the focus of this Article is not provision of a 
comprehensive sketch of these aspects of section 1983, we shall briefly 
detail the implications of qualified immunity and the necessity that 
certain challenged acts be by policy or custom.  
1. Causes of Action under State Law. It is impracticable to provide a 
fifty-state survey of the potential theories under state law that might 
provide a remedy. As to claims seeking credentials, a comprehensive 
survey would depend on municipal law as well, as it may be a local 
agency that would potentially issue the relevant credential,210 and any 
right to a credential could implicate the much more numerous 
provisions of municipal law.  
Restricting our focus to litigated disputes asserting state causes of 
action, we can encounter assorted cases addressing credentials. The 
authority has typically found some reason why there is not an 
entitlement to a credential. Some authority denies a right to a 
credential because the procedures for issuing credentials are informal 
and do not give rise to a protectable right,211 even if it allegedly has 
been an unofficial policy and uniform practice to issue a credential.212 
                                            
210   See generally In re Wheeler, 81 A.3d 728, 764 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) 
(stating credentials issued to a person retired from an “Arson Investigation Unit” by the 
Newark Police Department, identifying him as a retired “police captain” and an “arson 
captain,” are inadequate for purposes of LEOSA, because Arson Investigation Units 
“are established within a City’s fire department”). 
211   Mpras v. District of Columbia, 74 F. Supp. 3d 265, 271 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(inadequate allegations of entitlement for due process purposes). See generally Morello 
v. D.C., 621 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding the complainant failed to allege 
constitutional inadequacies in the process available through the District of Columbia 
Superior Court and, therefore, the complainant was not deprived of property without 
due process). Cf. Bernard v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville/Davidson Cty., No. 
M200900812COAR3CV, 2010 WL 3033798, at *4–5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010) 
(holding municipal ordinance that “directs the police department to ‘make a gift of a 
gun and a badge to all retiring officers who have at least twenty-five years of service 
upon their retirement and also to police officers who, regardless of years of service, 
receive a disability pension from the metropolitan government,’ ” is a “gift” and not a 
“retirement benefit,” for purposes of principles of construction). 
212   Rousseau v. Windsor Locks Police Comm’n, No. 3:10CV1312 MRK, 2012 WL 
3113134, at *3 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012) (finding an applicant does not have a property 
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Another case has denied recovery because the permit denial was not 
arbitrary and capricious.213 The frequency with which the claims, 
whether under state or federal law, fail for peculiar pleading 
deficiencies seems somewhat striking,214 although no effort is made 
here to endeavor to compare relative frequencies. There is, however, 
authority prohibiting denial of a replacement credential, sought when 
an originally issued credential had been damaged.215 
                                                                                                              
stating the applicant “has not pointed to any law or regulation that could have 
constrained ‘the opportunity of the [Commission] to deny issuance’ of his retirement 
credentials”). 
213   Kittle v. D’Amico, No. 4763–14, 2015 WL 12805146 at *3–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(applicant retired while under investigation for “failing to conduct a DWI test 
investigation on a motorist after observing two bottles of vodka in the center console”). 
214   E.g., Tesler v. Cacace, 607 F. App’x 87, 88 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding not ripe for 
judicial consideration a request for declaratory judgment where the applicant had not 
taken the necessary training), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 823 (2016), reh’g denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 1402 (2016); Morello v. D.C., 621 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding the 
complainant failed to allege constitutional inadequacies in the process available 
through the District of Columbia Superior Court and, therefore, the complainant was 
not deprived of property without due process); Sonoma Cty. Law Enf’t Ass’n v. Cty. of 
Sonoma, 379 F. App’x 658, 660 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a claim not ripe because the 
claimants did not adequately allege “a concrete plan to carry a concealed firearm 
outside California”); Pizzo v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. C 09–4493 CW, 2012 WL 
6044837, at *16 n.8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012) (dismissal of Equal Protection challenge to 
LEOSA for plaintiff’s failure to identify a proper defendant), appeal dismissed, No. 13–
15012, 9th Cir. (Mar. 8, 2013); Koren v. Noonan, No. CIV. A. No. 12–1586, 2013 WL 
5508688, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 586 F. App’x 885 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (holding claim alleging a property interest in an honorable discharge, arising 
from federal and state rights of retirees to possess firearms, was time barred); Foley v. 
Godinez, 62 N.E.3d 286, 294–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (holding writ of mandamus not 
available where the determination is discretionary, and entitlement to the credential 
depends on the discretionary determination whether an applicant is a qualified law 
enforcement officer; denying applicant’s request to add a declaratory judgment count); 
Bernard v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville/Davidson Cty., No. M200900812COAR3CV, 2010 
WL 3033798, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2010) (delayed filing of an amended 
complaint precluded litigation of Equal Protection claim arising from credential denial). 
215   Frawley v. Police Comm’r of Cambridge, 46 N.E.3d 504, 507, 518 (Mass. 2016) 
(concluding the applicant being under investigation for a citizen complaint at the time 
he retired was not a basis to deny a 2011 application for issuance of a replacement, 
although “[h]ad the commissioner been evaluating [the] application in March, 2004, he 
would have acted well within his discretion in refusing to issue an ID card given the 
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2. Implied Right of Action vs. Rights Remediable under Section 1983. 
A court in 2014 could state, “Every court to have considered the 
question has held that no private right of action exists under LEOSA 
because Congress explicitly intended for states to establish and enforce 
their own concealed firearm certification standards.”216 Although some 
courts have addressed the availability of a remedy for failure to provide 
a credential under principles governing whether there is an implied 
right of action under LEOSA,217 the more direct analysis involves 
                                            
216   Friedman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:14–CV–0821–GMN–GWF, 
2014 WL 5472604, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2014). 
217   For example, Moore v. Trent, No. 09 C 1712, 2010 WL 5232727 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
16, 2010), focuses on the existence of a remedy under LEOSA for failure to issue the 
credential, eliding discussion of the availability of a remedy under section 1983 if there 
merely is found to be a right under LEOSA: 
Plaintiffs argue that LEOSA unquestionably creates the right to carry a 
concealed firearm for qualified retired law enforcement officers. Plaintiffs’ 
argument is predicated on the assertion that once an applicant satisfies the 
criteria of a “qualified retired law enforcement officer” as enumerated in 
§ 926C(c), he is, as of right, automatically entitled to the identification card. 
Defendants contend that the statute confers a right solely to the holders of the 
identification card…. 
The court’s duty at this stage is to determine whether Congress implied a 
private remedy. After examining the plain language of the Act and its legislative 
history, the court concludes that LEOSA does not reflect Congress’ intent to 
create a federal private remedy. 
Id. at *3. The plaintiffs in Moore make the incomprehensible assertion that the denial of 
the permits violates 18 U.S.C. § 962, which prohibits the fitting-out of vessels to be 
employed against foreign states at peace with the United States. Class Action 
Complaint at 5, Moore v. Trent, No. 09 C 1712, 2010 WL 5232727 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 
2010) (“Defendants, acting in conjunction with each other and pursuant to a unified 
policy and practice, refuse to issue conceal carry permits to Plaintiffs and the class they 
purport to represent. This policy and practice violates 18 U.S.C. 962.”). 
Friedman v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, No. 2:14–CV–0821–GMN–
GWF, 2014 WL 5472604, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2014), a case removed from state court, 
merely asserts the absence of a private right of action, in analysis that omits reference 
to section 1983 (as did the complaint) (stating, “Every court to have considered the 
question has held that no private right of action exists under LEOSA because Congress 
explicitly intended for states to establish and enforce their own concealed firearm 
certification standards.”); see also Complaint, Friedman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police 
Dep’t, No. 2:14–CV–0821–GMN–GWF, 2014 WL 5472604, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2014). 
Johnson v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 709 F. Supp. 2d 
178, 183–184 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (footnote omitted), focuses on the existence of an implied 
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whether LEOSA creates a right remediable under section 1983. The 
trend denying a remedy was interrupted by the 2016 decision in 
DuBerry v. District of Columbia,218 where the court allows a cause of 
action to proceed under section 1983. 
We shall first sketch the framework developed by the Supreme 
Court. Then we shall summarize conflicting implementations — one 
holding a claim could proced under section 1983 and another not. 
The Supreme Court’s framework. The Supreme Court has contrasted 
two theories for seeking a remedy (an implied right of action and a 
cause of action under section 1983) in the following way:  
In implied right of action cases, we employ the four-factor Cort [v. 
Ash] test to determine “whether Congress intended to create the 
private remedy asserted” for the violation of statutory rights. The 
test reflects a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that 
Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of 
remedies for violations of statutes. Because § 1983 provides an 
“alternative source of express congressional authorization of 
private suits,” these separation-of-powers concerns are not 
present in a § 1983 case.219  
Two paragraphs in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzaga 
University v. Doe220 detail a number of pertinent principles: 
 (i) Both (x) finding whether an implied right of action exists 
and (y) determining whether an action is remediable under 
                                                                                                              
under section 1983: “Nothing in the text or structure of the statute bestows either an 
explicit right to obtain the identification required under § 926C(d) or a federal remedy 
for a state agency’s failure to issue such identification. Therefore, Congress did not 
expressly intend to create a private cause of action under LEOSA.” 
A court, of course, may be constrained to address the theory presented by the 
complainant. 
218   824 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
219   Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509, 110 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1990) 
(quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n., 453 
U.S. 1, 19 (1981)) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)) (citations omitted). Ziglar v. 
Abbasi, No. 15–1358, 2017 WL 2621317, at *10 (U.S. June 19, 2017), suggests a 
retrenchment in the availability of a private right of action has developed subsequent to 
Cort. 
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section 1983, involve a determination of whether “Congress 
intended to create a federal right.”221 
 (ii) Those two inquiries — whether Congress intended to 
create a federal right in these two contexts — are comparable (“no 
different,” in the Court’s language).222 
 (iii) For a federal right to be found to have been intended, the 
statute’s “text must be ‘phrased in terms of the persons 
benefited,’”223 suggesting the statutory language must literally 
have “an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.”224 The court 
cites authority distinguishing statutory language that “focuses . . . 
on the agencies that will do the regulating.”225 So, there is an 
idiosyncratic focus on the style of the language used for this 
particular interpretative purpose. 
 (iv) Although a person alleging a federal statute creates a 
private right of action “must show that the statute manifests an 
intent ‘to create not just a private right but also a private 
remedy,’”226 a person asserting a remedy under section 1983 need 
not, because “because § 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the 
vindication of rights secured by federal statutes.”227 
                                            
221   536 U.S. at 283 (emphasis removed). 
222   536 U.S. at 285 (“[T]he initial inquiry — determining whether a statute confers 
any right at all — is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of action 
case, the express purpose of which is to determine whether or not a statute ‘confer[s] 
rights on a particular class of persons.’” (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 
294 (1981)). 
223    536 U.S. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692, n. 
13 (1979)). 
224   536 U.S. at 284 (stating such statutory language creates individual rights and 
quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979)). 
225   536 U.S. at 284 n.3 (parenthetically citing, inter alia, Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001), for the proposition that “existence or absence of rights-
creating language is critical to the Court’s inquiry”); see also Alexander, 532 U.S. at 289 
(finding no right where the statutory language “focuses neither on the individuals 
protected nor even on the funding recipients being regulated, but on the agencies that 
will do the regulating”). 
226   536 U.S. at 284 (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286). 
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 (v) “Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an 
individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by 
§ 1983.”228 
Because the inquiry at hand involves deprivations by state actors,229 we 
can begin our analysis with whether LEOSA creates a right remediable 
under section 1983, as opposed to whether LEOSA creates an implied 
right of action.  
Blessing v. Freestone230 identifies three factors traditionally 
referenced in determining whether a federal statute creates a right 
enforceable under section 1983: 
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question 
benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so “vague and 
amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial 
competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a 
binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision 
giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, 
rather than precatory, terms.231 
After a plaintiff shows there is an enforceable right, a rebuttable 
presumption arises that the right is enforceable under section 1983.232 
“The defendant may defeat this presumption by demonstrating that 
Congress did not intend that remedy for a newly created right. Our 
cases have explained that evidence of such congressional intent may be 
found directly in the statute creating the right, or inferred from the 
statute’s creation of a ‘comprehensive enforcement scheme that is 
incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.’ ‘The crucial 
consideration is what Congress intended.’”233  
Following this approach, Gonzaga University v. Doe finds no such 
rights created in a statute whose language was focused on directing the 
activities of a government official, contrasting that conclusion with 
                                            
228   536 U.S. at 284. 
229   Section 1983 is limited to claims against persons acting “under color of” state 
law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40). 
230   520 U.S. 329 (1997). 
231   Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41 (citations omitted). 
232   City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 120 (2005). 
233   City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 120 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341; 
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prior authority finding rights where the statutory language focuses on 
the alleged beneficiaries (“No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to 
discrimination . . . .”).234  
The Court has recognized a statute as creating a right remediable 
under section 1983 where implementing the right is not perfunctory or 
routine. In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,235 the Supreme 
Court recognized a right to a remedy under section 1983 for a state’s 
failure to adopt reasonable medical reimbursement rates.236 So, one 
may conclude the following: that implementing the right is not 
                                            
234   Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287 (stating, “FERPA’s provisions speak only to the 
Secretary of Education, directing that ‘[n]o funds shall be made available’ to any 
‘educational agency or institution’ which has a prohibited ‘policy or practice.’ ” (citing 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1))). See also Delancey v. City of Austin, 570 F.3d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 
2009) (finding no right arising from language directing certain activities be taken by 
specified agencies).  
Courts are retrenching in concluding spending legislation gives rise to rights 
enforceable under section 1983. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 281 (“Our more recent decisions, 
however, have rejected attempts to infer enforceable rights from Spending Clause 
statutes.”); compare Long v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 166 F. Supp. 3d 16, 29–31 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(collecting cases with differing outcomes as to whether a right is created by the United 
States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75–412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) with  California Ass’n of Rural Health Clinics v. 
Douglas, 738 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding “Medicaid providers have a 
private right of action to bring a § 1983 claim to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb)”) and Pee 
Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2007) (same). 
235   496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
236   The Court states in Wilder : 
Such an inquiry turns on whether “the provision in question was intend[ed] to 
benefit the putative plaintiff.” If so, the provision creates an enforceable right 
unless it reflects merely a “congressional preference” for a certain kind of 
conduct rather than a binding obligation on the governmental unit, or unless the 
interest the plaintiff asserts is “ ‘too vague and amorphous’ ” such that it is “ 
‘beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.’ ” Under this test, we conclude 
that the Act creates a right enforceable by health care providers under § 1983 to 
the adoption of reimbursement rates that are reasonable and adequate to meet 
the costs of an efficiently and economically operated facility that provides care to 
Medicaid patients. The right is not merely a procedural one that rates be 
accompanied by findings and assurances (however perfunctory) of 
reasonableness and adequacy; rather the Act provides a substantive right to 
reasonable and adequate rates as well. 
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509–10 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 
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perfunctory does not prevent the right’s being enforceable under section 
1983. 
Allowing a section 1983 claim to proceed: DuBerry v. District of 
Columbia. DuBerry v. District of Columbia,237 a 2016 opinion, holds 
LEOSA creates a right to carry a concealed firearm that is due 
protection under section 1983.238 In the case, the court addresses a 
challenge to the District’s failure to affirm the claimants had statutory 
powers of arrest (which those providing the firearms certification 
required).239 
The language of LEOSA directly focuses on the alleged beneficiaries 
of a right, stating “an individual who is a qualified law enforcement 
officer . . . may carry a concealed firearm,”240 and “an individual who is 
a qualified retired law enforcement officer . . . may carry a concealed 
firearm.”241 A focus on the first Blessing factor, concerning an intent to 
benefit qualified personnel, would not seem productive for one inclined 
to deny the existence of a right under section 1983. 
In its analysis, the DuBerry court introduces a recitation of certain 
aspects of the legislative history by noting, “The legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress’s purpose was to afford certain retired law 
enforcement officers, in view of the nature of their past law enforcement 
responsibilities, the present means of self-protection and protection for 
the officer’s family and, as an added benefit, to provide additional safety 
for the communities where the officers live and visit.”242 
                                            
237   824 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
238   824 F.3d at 1052, 1054. 
239   Id. at 1048, 1050. 
The court rejects the assertion the claim that the right does not arise until a person 
obtains the requisite firearms certification: 
Consequently, the firearms certification requirement does not define the right 
itself but is rather a precondition to the exercise of that right. Understood as an 
individual right defined by federal law, the LEOSA concealed-carry right that 
appellants allege Congress intended for them to have is remediable under 
Section 1983. Their further allegation that they have been deprived of their 
ability to obtain and exercise that right because of the District of Columbia’s 
unlawful action is sufficient to state a claim. 
824 F.3d at 1050, 1055. 
240   18 U.S.C. § 926B(a). 
241   18 U.S.C. § 926C(a). 
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As to the second Blessing factor, DuBerry concludes the act is not too 
vague to prevent the existence of a right to a remedy. It describes 
LEOSA generally as “set[ting] specific requirements . . . in historical 
and objective terms.”243 As to the “existence and nature of [the 
applicant’s] [] statutory power of arrest,” the court does not suggest that 
determination is too “vague and amorphous” to strain judicial 
competence — one supposes it is a non-starter to suggest that it is 
beyond judicial competence to determine whether a person had 
statutory powers of arrest. The court merely references it as involving a 
factual question. In light of Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,244 
this application of this factor seems well within Supreme Court 
precedent. 
As to the third factor (concerning creation of a binding obligation on 
the states), the court focuses on the “categorical preemption of state and 
local law” and “the nature of the ministerial inquiries” required of 
states and localities, as imposing mandatory duties.245 The court does 
note the existence of retained discretion concerning a determination as 
to physical or mental incapacity, but summarily discards that as a basis 
for not finding the third factor as met, because the court states 
incapacity is not claimed and is thus not before the court.246  
No enforceable right under section 1983: Ramirez v. Port Authority 
of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ). On the other hand, Ramirez v. 
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ)247 holds LEOSA 
does not create a right enforceable under section 1983.248 The relevant 
                                            
243   824 F.3d at 1053. 
244   496 U.S. 498 (1990). See generally supra notes 235–236 and accompanying text 
for the circumstances of Wilder. 
245   824 F.3d at 1053. 
246   824 F.2d at 1054. 
247   No. 15cv3225 (DLC), 2015 WL 9463185 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015). 
248   A claim for false arrest was separately found wanting as follows: 
Finally, even if LEOSA protected Ramirez from arrest for carrying a concealed 
weapon and the DA's office should have known of its provisions, Ramirez was not 
charged with only that violation of the law. There was probable cause to 
prosecute Ramirez on the child endangerment charge because the loaded gun 
was found in the same area of the car as his two-year-old daughter's car seat. 
Ramirez does not dispute any of the material facts related to probable cause. 
Ramirez, 2015 WL 9463185, at *5. The circumstances under which a mistake of law can 
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analysis in Ramirez comprises four paragraphs. The first mostly 
summarizes the Blessing factors and provides a one-sentence quotation 
from Gonzaga University. The second paragraph mostly attempts to 
compare the circumstances to the lower court opinion in Duberry 
(which the appellate court subsequently reversed, in an analysis 
summarized above). The third paragraph summarizes the application of 
the Blessing factors in Torraco v. Port Authority of New York & New 
Jersey,249 which addresses whether a different federal firearms statute 
gives rise to a right enforceable under section 1983. The fourth 
paragraph concludes Torraco controls the result, stating in full: 
LEOSA shares these features, indicating that Congress did not 
intend to make its violation actionable under § 1983. This is true 
even assuming that LEOSA creates an individual right for law 
enforcement officers to carry concealed weapons under certain 
conditions. Like § 926A, enforcement of LEOSA is “vague and 
amorphous,” indicating that Congress did not intend for it to 
create a right whose violation would be actionable under § 1983. 
The warning in Torraco that allowing actions for damages based 
on violations of LEOSA could cause law enforcement to hesitate 
before enforcing gun control laws further indicates that Congress 
did not intend to create a federal right. Because LEOSA does not 
create an individual right actionable under § 1983, Ramirez’s 
§ 1983 claims based on violations of LEOSA are dismissed.250 
                                                                                                              
generally, e.g., State v. Stoll, 370 P.3d 1130, 1135 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (“We agree with 
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that ‘Heien does not support the proposition that a 
police officer acts in an objectively reasonable manner by misinterpreting an 
unambiguous statute.” (quoting United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th 
Cir. 2016) (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014)); Flint v. City of 
Milwaukee, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1057–58 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (stating, as to a city’s 
defense that an alleged mistake of law undermining probable cause for arrest, “[T]the 
Court has qualms about even applying Heien here, given that this is not a reasonable 
suspicion case. But see J Mack LLC v. Leonard, No. 13–CV–808, 2015 WL 519412, at 
*9, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15259, at *22 (S.D.Ohio Feb. 9, 2015) (stating that the court 
‘has no reservation in extending Heien’s rational to the probable cause analysis, 
especially given that the Supreme Court’s decision is based in part on nineteenth 
century precedent that it characterized as establishing the proposition that a mistake of 
law can support a finding of probable cause’).”). 
249   615 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Judge Cote’s Ramirez opinion is an embarrassment, illustrative of 
the dismissive treatment of firearm rights by some federal courts. As an 
inferior court, it was bound to apply Torraco if it controlled the 
disposition. But Torraco did not control the decision, and Torraco’s own 
reasoning is unsupported and thus cannot provide a basis for extension. 
As to why Torraco did not control the decision in Ramirez: Torraco 
involves a different statute — the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act.251 
That act allows interstate transport of firearms where the possession is 
lawful in both the origin and the destination, if other requirements are 
met.252 The Torraco court concludes difficulties police officers would 
have in ascertaining the legality of conduct in multiple other 
jurisdictions, on which the federal preemption depends, fails the second 
Blessing factor.253 The Torraco opinion asserts assuring compliance is 
impracticable, because an officer cannot be expected to be able to know 
whether the firearms possession will be lawful in both origin and 
destination locations.254 
The issue before the court in Ramirez is not comparable. The legality 
of the possession involved in Ramirez does not require knowledge of the 
law governing firearms possession in multiple other states. The officer 
merely needs to know the federal law, and confirm the existence of valid 
credentials.  
A difficulty in ascertaining whether credentials are valid was 
identified and resolved during debate on LEOSA. The International 
                                            
251   Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 926A and other 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) amended by Pub. L. No. 99–360, 100 Stat. 766 (1986). 
252   The firearm has to be unloaded and not readily accessible. 18 U.S.C. § 926A. In 
addition, courts have held that the poorly-written language requires the firearm be in 
the course of being transported in a vehicle, so that the statute does not protect 
transport of a firearm from a vehicle to an airline counter for check-in. Ass’n of New 
Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 730 F.3d 252, 
255 (3d Cir. 2013). (“It is plain . . . that the statute protects only transportation of a 
firearm in a vehicle . . . .”). 
253   615 F.3d at 136–39. 
254   Torraco, 615 F.3d at 138 (“Thus, in Weasner’s case, a police officer’s liability 
could turn on the correctness of his on-the-spot determination about whether Weasner’s 
hotel in New Jersey constituted a residence, and whether his trip to Ohio constituted a 
move. In Torraco’s case, a police officer would be obligated to speculate whether 
Torraco’s brief stop in New York prior to proceeding to the airport was ‘reasonably 
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Association of Chiefs of Police, who opposed the legislation, “expressed 
concern that because of difficulty in verifying the identity and eligibility 
of out-of-State law enforcement officers, passage of the bill could lead to 
a tragic situation where officers from other jurisdictions are wounded or 
killed by local police.”255 Among a laundry list of objections expressed by 
Representative Waters, who also opposed the legislation,256 was 
difficulty in verification of the credentials.257 
The House Committee focused on the extent to which the credentials 
should allow a law enforcement official to ascertain whether a person 
asserting rights under LEOSA was qualified. Rep. Sensenbrenner 
described an approved amendment he offered as “help[ing] officers 
clarify the good standing of individuals they may encounter.”258 
In sum, the House considered the extent to which the contemplated 
credentials ought to be adequate from the perspective of law 
enforcement officials encountering persons asserting rights under 
LEOSA, and amended the bill in light of one such specific concern. It 
did so after broader concerns with verification of credentials were 
raised. The legislative history does not support the view that the 
                                            
255   H.R. Rep. No. 108–560, at 4 (2004). 
256   Id. at 87 (dissenting Views of Rep. Conyers et al.). 
257   Id. at 57 (statement of Rep. Waters) (“I am not impressed with the fact that 
someone representing themselves as a law enforcement officer has a picture and even a 
badge. How do we know if they really are law enforcement officers, and how does the 
jurisdiction in which this officer attempts to enter know and how are they able to verify, 
do they have the means by which to do that, to ensure that this really is a law 
enforcement officer?”). 
258   Id. at 27 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“To help officers clarify the good 
standing of individuals they may encounter during a traffic stop or other similar 
situations, I have included in my amendment that the identification must show that the 
officer has received training in the last 12 months or the officer must carry a separate 
certification proving that he is current in his training. I believe that this amendment is 
an improvement to the legislation, and I ask my colleagues to support it. You know, I 
would note that the identification in the originally introduced legislation does not 
require that the identification include that the officer or retired officer is current in 
training because the provisions of the legislation are limited to those who are current in 
training. There ought to be something that the officer carries, that he or she indeed 
qualifies under the legislation. My amendment fixes it up, and I would urge support for 
the amendment.”); id. at 31 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (announcing the 
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statute was designed to allow the right LEOSA crafts to be fettered by 
law enforcement officers who quibble over the credentials. 
Moreover, any court should be cautious in extending Torraco, 
because its analysis is suspect. The relevant Blessing factor involves 
difficulties for the judiciary if a right is recognized,259 whereas the 
difficulty Torraco references is one of a different governmental branch. 
Torraco manufactures a sui generis concern arising from absence of 
evidence of an intend that police officers could be personally liable.260  
It is legitimate to question whether some obscure legal principle 
obviates the legality of what otherwise would appear to be lawful police 
officer conduct and thereby subjects a government employee to crippling 
personal liability. The problem with the Torraco/Ramriez approach is 
that it attempts to integrate the concern in the wrong component of the 
analysis. Rather, this concern is part of assessing the existence of 
qualified immunity that, if applicable, would eliminate personal 
liability.261 By treating the issue as a factor to the existence of a right at 
all improperly eliminates, for example, the ability of a person deprived 
of the right to compel training in a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief 
against a municipality. Concerns with personal liability of individual 
officers need not and should not pretermit such a claim. 
3. Limits of Section 1983 Remedial Provisions. Even if a court holds 
that LEOSA creates a right enforceable under section 1983, the detailed 
principles governing immunities under section 1983 might operate to 
prevent a claim in a particular case. The intricacy of the immunity 
principles prevents a comprehensive assessment of their application in 
the myriad circumstances where a claim of right under LEOSA could be 
asserted. However, there are a few specific issues that merit 
identification and some brief commentary: 
                                            
259   See supra note 231 and accompanying text.  
260   E.g., 615 F.3d at 137 (“We find no evidence either in the text or structure of 
Section 926A that would indicate that Congress intended that police officers tasked 
with enforcing state gun laws should be liable for damages when they fail to correctly 
apply Section 926A.”). 
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 (i) individual liability of an officer who deprives a person of 
rights under LEOSA may depend on whether this fits within the 
“extraordinary circumstances” exception;262 
 (ii) municipal liability depends on the activity being by virtue of 
a custom or policy; and 
 (iii) municipal liability for wrongful denial of a credential may 
depend on somewhat complex issues of whether the actor is treated 
as one who can, by virtue of his office, make “policy.”  
We will sketch the basic landscape and illuminate some of the relevant 
applications. 
The scope of the limits depends on whether the claims are against a 
state and its officials or municipalities and their officials. A state cannot 
be sued under section 1983.263 State officials cannot be sued under 
section 1983 in their official capacities for damages,264 although they 
can be so sued for damages in their individual capacities.265 And they 
can be sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities266 (but not in 
their personal capacities267) although in such a lawsuit, “the entity’s 
                                            
262     See, e.g., MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
§ 9A.05 (4th ed. Westlaw through 2018-1 Supp.); 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 116 
(Westlaw through Nov. 2017). 
263   Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (“[A] State is not 
a person within the meaning of § 1983.”); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (stating “[e]very person … 
shall be liable ….”) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40) (emphasis added). 
264   Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). 
265   Hafer, 502 U.S. at 23. 
266   Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (“Of course a 
state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a 
person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not 
treated as actions against the State.’”). 
267   Barrish v. Cappy, No. CIV.A. 06–837, 2006 WL 999974, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 
2006) (concerning Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice). The same holds true for an 
attempt to seek injunctive relief against a municipal official acting in his or her 
personal capacity. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (stating, 
as to a remedy sought against a school principal, “An issue remains, however, 
concerning whether injunctive relief can be sought against a defendant in his individual 
capacity if the act must be in his official capacity to have official consequences. The 
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‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal 
law.”268  
On the other hand, “Monell v. Department of Social Services held 
that local governmental bodies are persons under § 1983 and, hence, 
directly suable for compensatory damages and declaratory and 
injunctive relief. . . . The Court also concluded in Monell that local 
governmental officials may be sued in their official capacity for 
damages and retrospective declaratory and injunctive relief even 
though the local governmental body itself pays.”269 Persons suing a 
municipality, whether for damages or prospective relief (“such as an 
injunction or a declaratory judgment”)270 under section 1983 “must 
show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom.”271 
This requirement for a “municipal policy or custom” has been applied by 
lower courts to claims for injunctive relief against municipal officials 
sued in their official capacities.272 
Extraordinary circumstances. Under what are sometimes referenced 
as “extraordinary circumstances,”273 an employee can nevertheless 
avoid personal liability for infringement of a right secured by section 
1983. For example: 
[O]fficers can still prevail if they claim “extraordinary 
circumstances and can prove that [they] neither knew nor should 
have known of the relevant legal standard. But . . . the defense 
would turn primarily on objective factors.”274  
An older statement of the principle is: 
                                            
268   Moreno v. Ryan, No. CV1508312PCTSRBJZB, 2017 WL 2214703, at *4–5 (D. 
Ariz. May 19, 2017); Aleto v. State of California, No. EDCV150842RGKJEM, 2015 WL 
9305626, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015) (same). 
269   SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF 
SECTION 1983, § 6:5 (Westlaw through September 2016) (footnotes omitted) (citing 
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 
270  Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 31 (2010). 
271   Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. at 30–31. 
272   Jewell v. Miller Cty., Ark., 489 F. App’x 993, 994 (8th Cir. 2012); Cain v. City of 
New Orleans, No. CV 15–4479, 2017 WL 467685, at *15 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2017). 
273   See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
274   Wesby v. District of Columbia, 841 F. Supp. 2d 20, 38 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 765 
F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014); reh’g den’d, 816 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016); cert. granted, 137 S. 
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Ordinarily, a qualified immunity defense will fail if, as here, 
the law was clearly established at the time the action occurred, 
“since a reasonably competent public official should know the law 
governing his conduct.” However, if the official claims that 
extraordinary circumstances existed and can prove, based on 
objective factors, that he neither knew nor should have known the 
relevant legal standard, the defense should be applied. “[I]t is 
inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases 
reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is 
present, and * * * in such cases those officials * * * should not be 
held personally liable.”275 
This principle allows for recognition of the type of flexibility in 
curtailing individual liability — of the type of concern in Ramirez v. 
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ)276  — and 
nevertheless allow for vindication of rights where non-monetary relief is 
sought or where the concerns for limiting liability are less compelling, 
as would be the case where a municipality contumaciously adopts a 
policy flouting LEOSA.  
“Policy or custom” requirement. The “policy or custom” requirement 
may materially curtail the availability of a remedy against a 
municipality. Although a unilateral action by an inferior employee 
would not be included, a single decision can constitute a “policy” for 
these purposes,277 where made by one “whose acts or edicts may fairly 
be said to represent official policy.”278 For example, a court has noted as 
to a sheriff’s decisions not to maintain records required under state law 
of prisoner work:  
We note that even “a single decision may create municipal 
liability if that decision were made by a final policymaker 
responsible for that activity.” Sheriffs in Mississippi are final 
policymakers with respect to all law enforcement decisions made 
within their counties. Sheriff Howell admitted on the record that 
the department kept none of the required records detailing the 
                                            
275   E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kirksey, 885 F.2d 476, 478 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19; and Anderson, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 
(1987)) (citation omitted). 
276   No. 15cv3225 (DLC), 2015 WL 9463185 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015). 
277   Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). 
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locations and number of days prisoners worked. The jury could 
infer from this statement that the county had a policy of not 
keeping such records.279 
Because the classification as to who has final policymaking authority 
is a question of state law,280 the unilateral acts of a sheriff or police 
chief might or might not constitute a “policy.” Even in the absence of a 
“policy,” an action allegedly inconsistent with LEOSA might be treated 
as custom, sufficient to give rise to a remedy: 
Proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient to 
establish custom. But a plaintiff may prove “the existence of a 
custom or informal policy with evidence of repeated constitutional 
violations for which the errant municipal officials were not 
discharged or reprimanded.” Once such a showing is made, a 
municipality may be liable for its custom “irrespective of whether 
official policy-makers had actual knowledge of the practice at 
issue.”281 
                                            
279   Brooks v. George Cty., Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown v. 
Bryan County, Oklahoma, 67 F.3d 1174, 1183 (5th Cir.1995) (emphasis in Brown)) 
(citations omitted). 
280   See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (quoting City of St. 
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (plurality opinion)) (“[W]hether a 
particular official has ‘final policymaking authority’ is a question of state law.”). See 
generally, e.g., Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (granting summary 
judgment on basis that complaint asserts the town administrator ordered an 
individual's ejection of a pub manager, negating the claim the police chief had final 
policy-making authority); Gros v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex., 181 F.3d 613, 617 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (remanding for determination whether city chief of police had final 
policymaking authority in connection with claims for abusive traffic stop); Bennett v. 
Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 586 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Turner v. Upton Cty., Tex., 915 F.2d 
133, 136 (5th Cir. 1990)) (stating, as to claims arising from an alleged rape by a sheriff 
in the course of an investigation, “In this circuit, ‘[i]t has long been recognized that, in 
Texas, the county sheriff is the county’s final policymaker in the area of law 
enforcement, not by virtue of the delegation by the county’s governing body but, rather, 
by virtue of the office to which the sheriff has been elected.’”). 
281   Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714–15 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial of 
reh’g (Jan. 12, 1996) (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir.1992); 
Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989)). Another 
statement is provided in Mitchell v. City & County of Denver, 112 F. App’x 662 (10th 
Cir. 2004): 
A custom is a “persistent and widespread” practice which “constitutes the 
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The clearly established right requirement; illustrations. State and 
local officials benefit from qualified immunity in damages actions,282 
but not in claims for injunctive relief or declaratory judgments.283 The 
Supreme Court has recently noted the following concerning qualified 
immunity: 
                                                                                                              
series of decisions by a subordinate official of which the supervisor must have 
been aware. Liability attaches in such a case, because “the supervisor could 
realistically be deemed to have adopted a policy that happened to have been 
formulated or initiated by a lower-ranking official.” “But the mere failure to 
investigate the basis of a subordinate's discretionary decisions does not amount 
to a delegation of policymaking authority.”  
Id. at 672 (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); City of St. 
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (plurality); id. (footnote and citation 
omitted). George M. Weaver, Ratification As an Exception to the S 1983 Causation 
Requirement: Plaintiff's Opportunity or Illusion?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 358, 373–77 (2010) 
(collecting cases addressing the number of incidents sufficient or insufficient to find a 
custom). 
A review of model jury instructions reveals the following vague standard as to what 
might be a custom: 
A “policy or custom” includes a … practice or course of conduct that is so 
widespread that it has acquired the force of law — even if the practice has not 
been formally approved. You may find that a “policy or custom” existed if there 
was a practice that was so persistent, widespread, or repetitious that [name of 
city]’s policymaker[s] either knew of it, or should have known of it. 
3B KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 168:180 (6th 
ed. Westlaw through Aug. 2016). Another illustration: “Official [policy/custom]” means: 
[insert one of the following:] … [A custom that is a permanent, widespread, or well-
settled practice of the [city/county] ….”  Judicial Council of California Advisory 
Committee on Civil Jury Instructions, Judicial Council of California Civil Jury 
Instruction 3002, Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction 3002 (Westlaw 
through July 2017). See generally Matthew J. Cron et al., Municipal Liability: 
Strategies, Critiques, and A Pathway Toward Effective Enforcement of Civil Rights, 91 
DENV. U. L. REV. 583, 593–94 (2014) (discussing use of statistical evidence to prove a 
custom). 
282   E.g., Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (addressing state police 
officers); SHELDON H. NAHMOD CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF 
SECTION 1983 § 8:98 (Westlaw through Sept. 2016) (“The decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the circuits demonstrate that the qualified immunity test covers all state and 
local government officials at all levels of responsibility, with the exception of those who 
have absolute immunity.”). 
283   DAVID W. LEE, HANDBOOK OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 9.03 (2017) (“Qualified 
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A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified 
immunity unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional 
right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged 
conduct. A right is clearly established only if its contours are 
sufficiently clear that “a reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right.” In other words, “existing 
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 
question beyond debate.” This doctrine “gives government officials 
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and 
“protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.’ ”284 
These limits on rights to recover under section 1983 create an 
intricate mosaic that may operate to prevent vindication of rights under 
LEOSA in a particular context. A few ways in which that may play-out 
can be sketched. 
As noted, a person seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate a 
violation of a policy or custom.285 The credential might be sought, for 
example, from a sheriff or chief of police, whose acts might not 
constitute a “policy.”286 And there might not be enough denials to 
evidence a persistent and widespread practice,287 as “random acts or 
isolated incidents” are normally insufficient.288 (Of course, arrests in 
                                            
284   Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (addressing state police officers) 
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 
731, 741 (2011); id. at 743; id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)) 
(citation omitted). Justice Thomas has recently criticized the landscape of the current 
jurisprudence, stating, “Because our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law 
backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in 
‘interpret[ing] the intent of Congress in enacting’ the Act.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). 
285   See supra notes 268–271 and accompanying text. 
286   See supra note 279–280 and accompanying text. 
287   See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
288   Daniel v. Hancock Cty. Sch. Dist., 626 F. App’x 825, 832 (11th Cir. 2015). 
It bears mention that this context may be somewhat different than the norm, in 
ways not typically captured in the litigation but that a court could well find important. 
If a private person is denied prospective relief as to a credential, that is inherently an 
ongoing denial. The need for repeated occurrences is sometimes referenced in the 
context of assuring the decision-maker is aware of the actions. E.g., Hancock Cty. Sch. 
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violation of LEOSA are particularly likely not to be pursuant to a policy 
and subject to the normal limits on frequency so as not to constitute a 
custom.) 
 Thus, a claim for injunctive relief under section 1983 as to failure to 
assist with obtaining credentials may fail because there is not a state or 
municipal “policy” or adequately widespread custom289 that is 
inconsistent with LEOSA, and the persons involved in the denial were 
not final policymakers under state law.  
In such a case, a claim against the person who failed to issue the 
credential in his or her individual capacity might fail because the right 
to a credential is not “clearly established” (giving the individual 
qualified immunity), unless the denial was treated as non-
discretionary, ministerial act (litigated in a court recognizing that 
exception).290 Under current doctrine,291 a court determining there is 
not a clearly established right need not in that case (and often does not) 
in that opinion address whether the right exists.292 So, the availability 
                                                                                                              
constructive knowledge of such customs or policies to be attributed to the governing 
body of the municipality.”) A court could take the position that denials of firearms 
permits that result in requests for prospective relief are necessarily going to involve 
decision-makers becoming aware of the circumstances and, therefore, the denial is 
necessarily a product of a policy.  
289   An illustration of adequate allegations of a custom is provided by Perros v. 
County of Nassau, No. CV 15–5598, 2017 WL 728711, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017) 
(finding adequate allegations of a custom in equal protection challenge to denial of 
documentation (so-called “good-guy letters”) allegedly on the basis of retirement on the 
basis of disability). See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b), at 33, Perros, 2017 WL 728711 
(six named plaintiffs and statement denial on account of retirement for disability); First 
Amended Complaint at 8, Perros, 2017 WL 728711 (alleging “Defendant[’s] . . . sole 
reason for his denial was the fact that Plaintiffs were injured and/or was disabled for 
medical reasons at the time of their application for retirement.”). 
290   See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
291   In 2009, the Supreme Court held, “The judges of the district courts and the 
courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding 
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in 
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 236 (2009). This reversed the approach the Court dictated only a few years before 
in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (addressing constitutional rights). 
292   E.g., Chesney v. City of Jackson, 171 F. Supp. 3d 605, 609, 619–22 (E.D. Mich. 
2016) (finding, as to one who carried a firearm in a government building and also 
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of a remedy might require a sufficient passage of time so that there are 
sufficient denials to constitute a custom. If the credentialing entity is 
local, that might not happen quickly. And even if a state entity does the 
credentialing, that might not happen quickly if denials are inconsistent. 
However, some authority holds that qualified immunity does not 
apply to non-discretionary, ministerial acts.293  
CONCLUSION 
The purposes supporting adoption of LEOSA are to allow the covered 
individuals, certain current and retired qualified law enforcement 
personnel, to protect themselves, in light of circumstances that may 
have arisen from their work in that capacity; and to allow these persons 
potentially to supplement local law enforcement efforts.294 The act is 
one of a number that preempt state firearms regulation, including the 
                                                                                                              
carry a firearm outside the home was not clearly established, eliding a determination of 
whether such a right exists). To provide another illustration, Schaefer v. Whitted, 121 
F. Supp. 3d 701, 707 (W.D. Tex. 2015), involves allegations that, immediately upon a 
person’s exiting his house with a holstered firearm, “Without identifying himself, and 
without warning, [an officer, one Whitted,] immediately grabbed [the occupant’s] left 
arm in an attempt to physically remove the gun from its holster,” quickly leading to the 
homeowner being shot to death. The court concludes, “[T]here is no clearly established 
rules putting Officer Whitted on notice his actions even implicated the Second 
Amendment.” Id. at 711 (emphasis added). The case elides addressing the scope of the 
right, although it does nevertheless allow to proceed claims seeking increased training 
for use of deadly force, interaction with persons legally armed and the Second 
Amendment. Id. at 719. Certain claims asserting Fourth Amendment violations were 
allowed to proceed. Id. at 715. 
293   Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating as to an alleged 
failure to provide the complainant with proper application materials for reciprocal real 
estate licensure, “These ministerial acts are unshielded by qualified immunity, which 
protects ‘only actions taken pursuant to discretionary functions.’”) (quoting F.E. Trotter, 
Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)); Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 
157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing failure to maintain records of a trusty’s work, 
“Mississippi law, as quoted above, imposes on Sheriff Howell a non-discretionary duty 
to keep records of work performed by pretrial detainees and to transmit those records to 
the board of supervisors so that pretrial detainees can be paid. Sheriff Howell thus is 
not entitled to qualified immunity from individual liability on this due process claim.”). 
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Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993,295 and the Firearms 
Owners’ Protection Act.296 Some of the state responses to LEOSA seem 
contumacious. For example, we have a state that publicly purports to 
prohibit certain ammunition be carried by qualifying personnel,297 
when that position is directly contradicted by LEOSA’s text. Such a 
response is, of course, manifestly unsatisfactory. 
Although LEOSA was initially adopted in 2004,298 there remain 
basic questions concerning its scope. A primary issue not yet answered 
by the courts is whether the act preempts state and local restrictions on 
possession of firearms having particular features (other than bans on 
fully automatic firearms and sound suppressors). This is an important 
question for those who would wish to rely on LEOSA. In the view of 
some, state restrictions that ban magazines, owned by private persons 
in the tens of millions or more, would remain applicable.299 It would 
allow to subsist application to qualifying personnel of other obscure 
local restrictions, such as those in Chicago prohibiting laser sights on 
handguns.  
There is a substantial impediment to realization of the act’s goals —
allowing qualifying personnel to travel nation-wide and be able to 
protect themselves, and potentially assist local law enforcement — if 
the preemption is incomplete, requiring the qualifying persons 
ascertain whether the particular firearms features are banned in every 
locality they transit. Although it is clear why a jurisdiction that did not 
wish to have its laws preempted would wish for a maze of local 
regulations to make use of the right impracticable, the question for 
students of the law is whether the statute admits of this interpretation 
that would frustrate its evident purposes. 
The argument that these restrictions on firearms features are not 
preempted is rather laughable. It involves what purports to be a literal 
                                            
295   Id. (referencing the Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103–55, 107 Stat. 276 (1993) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5901–5904 (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 115–40))). 
296   Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 926A and other 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), amended by Pub. L. No. 99–360, 100 Stat. 766 (1986). 
297   See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
298   Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–277, 118 Stat. 
865 (2004). 
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interpretation of the statutory language but, ironically, does not 
actually reflect an understanding of what is meant by a literal 
interpretation.300 
The absurd view that one might encounter is that the statute does 
not make express reference to “magazines” and, thus, a literal 
interpretation compels the conclusion that the statute does not preempt 
restrictions on magazine limits. To assert a literal interpretation 
requires a particular conclusion, one necessarily must apply the actual 
statutory language. The statute states, “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of the law of any State or any political subdivision thereof, an 
individual . . . may carry a concealed firearm . . . .”301 It then defines 
“firearm.” An ordinary semi-automatic pistol having inserted in it, for 
example, an original equipment manufacturer’s 17-round magazine, for 
example, is literally within that definition of firearm.302 So, the statute 
literally states that, as to this firearm having this particular 
component, a qualifying person can carry it in a state, notwithstanding 
“any other provision of” state law.  
A focused state or local ban, e.g., one referencing magazine size, is 
literally included in “any other provision of” state law. Thus, the statute 
literally provides the illustrative firearm can be carried 
notwithstanding such a ban. This rather foolish interpretative approach 
is not literal at all. It requires that “any” does not mean “any;” that 
statutory reference to “notwithstanding any other provision of the law 
of any State” does not mean what it says but, rather, “notwithstanding 
some other provision[s] of the law of any state.” Because “any” does not 
mean “only some,” an assertion that restrictions on firearm features, 
such as the capacity of its integral component, a magazine, is not a 
literal reading of the statute. 
To conclude LEOSA does not preempt state and local restrictions on 
firearms features: 
 (i) One would need to find the facially unambiguous 
statutory language is ambiguous.303 
                                            
300   See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
301   18 U.S.C. §§ 926B(a)  (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40); see also id. 
§ 926C(a). 
302     See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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 (ii) One would need to avoid application of the “cardinal” 
principle of construction that rejects an interpretation that makes 
language surplusage.304 
 (iii) One would need to distinguish construction of similar 
language in another section of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
FOPA, which should be construed in pari materia, which has been 
construed as preempting state or local restrictions on firearm 
features.305 To conclude that authority is incorrect would 
substantially eviscerate the efficacy of that other section and be 
inconsistent with its prior judicial construction. 
 (iv) One would need to ignore the legislative history, which 
indicates LEOSA was intended to allow qualified persons to 
possess “any gun,” other than those whose features by express 
provision are not subject to preemption.306 
 (v) One would need to reject a position expressly taken by 
the United States in litigation, that LEOSA preempts restrictions 
on firearms because the arms have particular features (there, a 
semi-automatic sporting rifle).307 
 (vi) One would need to reject application of the rule of 
lenity.308 
There is nothing in the statute or its context that would support those 
conclusions, so as to make the carrying of a firearm authorized by 
LEOSA impracticable for qualifying persons. 
The argument that one encounters that LEOSA does not allow 
qualifying persons to possess firearms within 1000 feet of an 
elementary or secondary school309 is almost as absurd. It suasion is 
confined to those who misunderstand the principle of statutory 
construction as involving assembly of the parsing of sentence 
fragments and stopping there — those eliding judicial conclusions that, 
for example, (i) principles of statutory construction may cause a 
category comprising “tangible object” not to include, as inconsistent 
                                            
304   See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
305   See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
306   See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
307   See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
308   See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
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with statutory objectives, fish;310 and (ii) from the context, statutory 
reference to something “established by the state” might, under some 
principles of construction, involve something the state in fact declined 
to establish. Finding that persons benefitting from LEOSA are not 
prohibited to carry firearms within 1000 feet of a school is a much more 
straight-forward process than those conclusions that the Supreme 
Court has reached. 
A conclusion that licensure under LEOSA does not satisfy the 
licensure requirements under the Gun-Free School Zones Act would 
necessitate a conclusion, by construing sections in pari materia, that 
persons authorized to carry firearms out-of-state under the Armored 
Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993311 cannot do so within 1000 feet of 
a school. That, of course, would effectively disarm these personnel out-
of-state and is a result that can be rejected as inherently absurd. 
The legislative history is clear that the act was intended to allow 
qualifying personnel to carry concealed firearms “anywhere within the 
United States,” subject to the express limitations in the statute as to 
private property and state and local property. The five-sentence 
summary of the House report states that. Assorted Representatives 
stated that. All the references in the legislative history to “schools” 
indicate the act was understood as not resulting in qualifying personnel 
being effectively prohibited from carrying a firearm within 1000 feet of 
a school.312 Were that to have been understood, there would not have 
been a proposal to amend the statute so as to not preempt state 
restrictions of firearms on schools — but there was such an amendment 
(albeit one that was rejected).313 
After King v. Burwell,314 the conclusion that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act does not apply to persons carrying firearms under LEOSA 
follows a fortiori. 
                                            
310   See supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text. 
311   See supra note 165–169 and accompanying text (referencing the Armored 
Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–55, 107 Stat. 276 (1993) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5901–5904 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–40))). 
312   See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text.   
313   See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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The better view is that LEOSA creates a right enforceable under 
section 1983. The contrary view, expressed in Ramirez v. Port Authority 
of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ),315 is poorly reasoned. Ramirez 
inexplicably takes the position that some other statute is too 
burdensome to subject local law enforcement officials to financial 
liability for non-compliance, so LEOSA should not give rise to a right 
under section 1983.316 To state the analysis is to reject it. Moreover, the 
authority on which Ramirez relies, Torraco v. Port Authority of New 
York & New Jersey,317 is doctrinally defective.318 It in fact admittedly 
fails to apply the terms of a Supreme Court analysis that it recites as 
applicable.319 
Objections that LEOSA would give rise to a right that would be 
invalid under principles prohibiting commandeering reflect a 
misunderstanding of Supreme Court precedent. The Court has, in fact, 
validated federal regulation that requires a state to engage in activity 
that it finds burdensome, and that actually requires a state to provide 
information (evidence of ownership, in that case) to the public. 320 An 
argument that the federal government cannot force a state to provide 
information (in the case at hand, confirmation of a person’s prior 
employment) is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. One error 
of courts that have found a commandeering problem is their failure to 
recognize, as the cases make patent, that the proscription on 
commandeering is limited to federal impositions “requir[ing] state 
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating 
private individuals.”321 LEOSA does not do this. Rather, it involves 
federal impositions arising from preventing states and localities from 
criminalizing particular conduct. 
                                            
315   No. 15cv3225 (DLC), 2015 WL 9463185 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2015); see supra note 
247 and accompanying text. 
316   See supra notes 250 and accompanying text. 
317   615 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2010). 
318   See supra notes 259–260 and accompanying text. 
319   See Torraco v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 615 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 
2010) (“Appellants are correct that the language of the second factor focuses on whether 
the rights conferred would be difficult for the judiciary, as opposed to law enforcement 
officials, to identify and enforce.”). 
320   See supra note 204–208 and accompanying text. 
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The remedial limits that have been developed for claims under 
section 1983, as Justice Thomas has recently noted, are not actually 
tethered to “the common-law backdrop against which Congress enacted 
the 1871 Act.”322 Insofar as a court finds a need not to allow a damages 
remedy to the careless but not contumacious police officer who fails to 
recognize the scope of LEOSA and arrests a person for acts protected by 
LEOSA, the Supreme Court can either amplify extant exceptional 
circumstances exceptions or create another sui generis component to 
this sui generis remedial scheme. It need not simply conclude that the 
sui generis remedial scheme is now so frozen that no right whatsoever 
can be recognized to have been created under LEOSA, even for 
injunctive relief. 
                                            
322   Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
